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Most recent 20 results returned for keyword: Jordan Hill (Search this on MAP)

https://plus.google.com/111933724483804878815 Melody Moonlight : GUYS GUYS my friends birthday is soon kinda! Its on the 25! So mabey please draw her oc for her? Shes...
GUYS GUYS my friends birthday is soon kinda! Its on the 25! So mabey please draw her oc for her? Shes +Jordan Hill​ so heres a picure of her oc full body without the hoodie but you can draw it if you want. Mabey i should make this a contest but i dont know yet.
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-wOjQl6LHClg/WPy2QbFOyhI/AAAAAAAAs6o/xxhDhWYwpXk_49dw_cRcpXBAqX2mRVmZwCL0B/w506-h750/17%2B-%2B4
21 hours ago - Via Reshared Post - View -
https://plus.google.com/117903616656755193357 Omega Netflix : Pinned post Infos and something idk ⬇⬇⬇ Real name: I don't want to say that gender: Female Life in...
Pinned post

Infos and something idk ⬇⬇⬇

Real name: I don't want to say that
gender: Female
Life in/was born in: Germany
Age: 14
Birthday: 7. january
Crush: HIM of course😍


Likes:

Google+
YouTube
Draw
Make Animations
My Friends
Halo bat
My sister and family
Mariju
Powerpuff girls
Cartoons


Dont likes:

School
Mean Peoples
Very mean Peoples
No Time
Art/oc stealer
Sports (im lazy)
Requests

Favorite animal

CATS!!!! (And dogs)
but i too like Rodents like Hamsters and Rats


Favorite Food

Idk Pizza and Cookies
But with Milk :>

Arts

Many HIM stuff
Cute stuff
But somethimes gore or just violence

Requests: oh man there are stupid
Art trades: yes much better ad requests
Contest: maybe soon or idk

Best friends:

+Halo Bat​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Dragon HF
+Deutscher Fisch​​
+Skye CanTasteRainbows​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Katty Polish​​​​​​
+ImmaBadGirlMatt​​​​

Friends:

+Mattie Quinzel​​​​​​​​
+ღNgọc Thuy ღKinna​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Kiri SilverSoul​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+bloody the rowdy evil girl​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Mechasnail AJ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Apricity McFarley​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Pony Shit Cutie​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Kaoru The PPGZ /Buttercup The Cool One​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+PHILOSOPHIC BUNNY​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Bubbles Powerpuffgirl​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+HIM​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+HipLawyerCat 26​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Jordan Hill​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Melody Moonlight​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Princess Morbucks​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Aparna Priyadarsini​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Trash Queen​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Elizabeth the destiny girl​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Izanami Aida​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Neko Ney​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Kristina Stjepanovic​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Cotton Sugarfloss​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+don johnson escaros​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Drpy Doodlebob101​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Bendy the Dancing Demon​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Bendy​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Aqua Blaze​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+sugarplum vodka​​​​​​​​​​​​​
+Rabbitation PPG and Show​​​​​​​​​​​​
+The Puppet​​​​​​​​​​​
+Wrench​​​​​​​​​​
+gumdark kkk​​​​​​​​​​
+Creeper Beats Explotions​​​​​​​​​
+Brenden DaGansta777​​​

I Think i forgot many Friends
Please Say me if i have forgot you

Thanks for Reading
And thanks for being here on g+
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-Hzy3d3tFhqg/WNvXuEihGyI/AAAAAAAAY7M/iJaPVmbZiiIhKoli96vOoq5TxTz0ya83QCJoC/w506-h750/29.03.17%2B-%2B1
1 day ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/116033088964172024173 jordan hill : hey everyone
hey everyone

4 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/105292498380640593471 Seattle Website Design : 2017 NFL Draft Preview: Could The Seahawks Add More Defensive Line Depth?: With the NFL Draft coming...
2017 NFL Draft Preview: Could The Seahawks Add More Defensive Line Depth?: With the NFL Draft coming up, Seahawks.com is taking a position-by-position look at where things currently stand on the Seahawks’ roster, as well as the top prospects at each position. We’ll also look at Seattle’s draft history at each position under general manager John Schneider and head coach Pete Carroll. The Seahawks currently hold seven picks in the 2017 draft, which begins Thursday, April 27 in Philadelphia. Read * Round 1 | Pick 26 | No. 26 overall * Round 2 | Pick 26 | No. 58 overall * Round 3 | Pick 26 | No. 90 overall * Round 3 | Pick 38 | No. 102 overall* * Round 3 | Pick 42 | No. 106 overall* * Round 6 | Pick 26 | No. 210 overall * Round 7 | Pick 8 | No. 226 overall *-Compensatory Pick Our draft preview series began Monday with the offensive line. Today, we shift the focus to the other side of the ball and take a look at the defensive line.  Read Draft History Under Schneider and Carroll * DE E.J. Wilson (No. 127 overall, 2010) * DE Dexter Davis (No. 236, 2010) * DE Pep Levingston (No. 205, 2011) * DE Bruce Irvin (No. 15, 2012; Irvin later switched to LB) * DE Jaye Howard (No. 114, 2012) * DE Greg Scruggs (No. 232, 2012) * DT Jordan Hill (No. 87, 2013) * DT Jesse Williams (No. 137, 2013) * DE Cassius Marsh (No. 108, 2014) * DT Jimmy Staten (No. 172, 2014) * DE Frank Clark (No. 63, 2015) * DE Obum Gwacham (No. 209, 2015) * DT Jarran Reed (No. 49, 2016) * DT Quinton Jefferson (No. 147, 2016) Where the Seahawks Stand The Seahawks should feel pretty good about where things stand with a defensive line that was a strength of their defense last season. Starting ends Cliff Avril and Michael Bennett are both coming off of Pro Bowl seasons, Frank Clark had 10.0 sacks in his second season, defensive tackle Ahtyba Rubin, who helped anchor a run defense that allowed a league-low 3.4 yards per carry in 2016, is back for a third season in Seattle, and Jarran Reed is looking to take a Clark-esque leap in year two after a promising rookie campaign. Depth options include Cassius Marsh, who took another step forward in his third season, and Quinton Jefferson, a fifth-round pick last year who missed most of his rookie season with a knee injury. Yet as much as the Seahawks might like what they already have at defensive line, that won’t stop them from looking to upgrade that position group in the draft, perhaps even in the first couple of rounds. As Carroll puts it, teams can never have enough pass rushers, so if the right player were available in the early rounds, it would hardly be a surprise to see the Seahawks add help there, even with Bennett, Avril and Clark already on the roster. And at defensive tackle, Tony McDaniel, a starter for much of last season, is a free agent, meaning another run-stopping defensive tackle could be on Seattle’s list of needs. Read NFL Media Draft Expert Mike Mayock’s Top 5 Interior Defensive Linemen 1. Jonathan Allen, Alabama  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Outstanding leader and athlete with an ability to rush the passer from outside or inside. Has produced against the run and pass thanks to his strength, agility, elite hand usage, and plus footwork. He might not be the cleanest fit inside as a full-time tackle for some teams, but his talent should trump any size concerns. Allen is a likely first-round selection with Pro Bowl potential down the road. 2. Chris Wormley, Michigan  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Three-year starter who brings leadership and high character into the locker room. Wormley's size and athleticism could appeal to teams that favor big, strong base ends who can set a physical edge and then bump inside as pass rushers. Wormley could be coaxed into a more sophisticated pass-rush approach with coaching, but he's not there yet. His size, athleticism and versatility gives him a chance to earn early playing time and to become an eventual starter. 3. Malik McDowell, Michigan State Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Has similar physical traits and abilities of Arik Armstead and DeForest Buckner, but may not share their football character. McDowell lacked production along the interior and could benefit from a move to a defensive end spot in a 4-3 or 3-4 front. McDowell is raw, but when he flashes, it can be blinding. McDowell is an explosive, ascending prospect with All-Pro potential if he grows into his body and takes the necessary coaching. 4. Caleb Brantley, Florida  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Powerful, stout defensive tackle with the quickness to play the three-technique and the power to play the nose. Brantley has the talent and traits that should appeal to both two-gap and one-gap defenses. While we haven't seen Brantley play in even half of Florida's defensive snaps in a single year, the talent is there to become an early starter and a defensive force up front. T-5. Larry Ogunjobi, Charlotte Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Watching Ogunjobi play is like watching a more raw version of Sheldon Rankins and with a little less efficiency of movement. Like Rankins, Ogunjabi uses leverage, quickness, and strong hands to counter his average size. Size and below-average length will work against him for some teams, but others who covet disruptive defensive tackles who can play in the backfield and generate some pressure will be studying him closely. Has starting NFL potential. T-5. Dalvin Tomlinson, Alabama Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Prototypical Alabama defensive tackle who wins with leverage, power and technique. Tomlinson's powerful frame and ability to stack the run between the tackles could make him a scheme-flexible target in the draft. While he is likely to be drafted as a run bully, his history of operating in Alabama's stunt-and-twist-oriented defense could help keep him on the field on third downs for teams using a similar concept. Tomlinson has a chance to become an early starter and should work into a defensive line rotation immediately. Read NFL Media Draft Expert Mike Mayock’s Top 5 Edge Rushers 1. Myles Garrett, Texas A&M  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Elite edge rusher who possesses rare explosiveness and the fluid-movement skills and agility of an NBA shooting guard. Good size, but he's never likely going to be a hold-your-ground run defender, and might be best suited as an outside linebacker. However, his ability to explode into the backfield through a gap or around the edge gives him disruptive potential on every snap. Garrett still needs to fine-tune his pass-rush strategy and could stand to give more consistent effort from the start of the snap until the whistle. But his pass-rush production and athletic traits point toward an all-pro career. 2. Solomon Thomas, Stanford Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Explosive defender who combines strength, quickness, and a muscle-car motor to drive him around the field making play after play. Has the hands and feet to be a quick-win specialist and the size to fit as a 4-3 or 3-4 defensive end who can reduce inside for pass-rush downs. He has all the athletic traits to become a high-impact player and possesses more than enough skill and talent to believe he will continue to elevate his game as a pro. Thomas has the potential to become the best defender from this draft class and a future all-pro. 3. Derek Barnett, Tennessee  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Strong edge presence with NFL-caliber hand usage and play strength. Barnett is one of the most productive defensive linemen to come out of the SEC in quite some time despite lacking the length and twitch that teams usually look for off the edge. His awareness and play traits should keep him near the action and he has the talent to step into a starting base end spot right away. There could be coordinators who view him as an early down, outside backer in a 3-4 with the ability to put his hand in the ground on sub packages. 4. Takkarist McKinley, UCLA  Bottom Line (via NFL.com): Ascending edge prospect who racked up impressive TFL and sack numbers this year despite a relatively raw approach and skill set. He's a little stiff in his lower body, but flashes good athleticism once the ball is snapped. McKinley's motor is a translatable characteristic, but improved hand usage and pass rush mechanics are what could elevate his game to another level as a starting, 3-4 outside linebacker. 5. Charles Harris, Missouri Bottom Line (via NFL.com): High-cut pass rusher with good athleticism but concerns regarding his ability to drop anchor against the run. Ironically, Harris might be best suited as a penetrator which is something he fought against this season. His hands can be improved as pass rush weapons, but he has agility and footwork that can't be taught. Harris can play on the edge in a 4-3 or 3-4 front and should be the next in a line of early contributing defensive ends coming out of Missouri. Read RELATED * 2017 NFL Draft Preview: Will The Seahawks Draft An Offensive Lineman Early Again? View gallery11 Slides 2017 NFL Draft: Mike Mayock's Top Defensive Linemen Read http://dlvr.it/NwZMfd
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5 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/105480585871106305346 Jordan Hill : I just competed in STAGE 1 of the NASCAR Academy event! I came 16th in my Chevrolet SS!
I just competed in STAGE 1 of the NASCAR Academy event! I came 16th in my Chevrolet SS! 
10 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/108264794692970236241 Wisconsin State Journal : Hill, a fourth-year junior, is set to earn his degree in May and can play next season as a graduate ...
Hill, a fourth-year junior, is set to earn his degree in May and can play next season as a graduate transfer without having to sit out a year.
Badgers men's basketball: Guard Jordan Hill won't return to Wisconsin next season | Wisconsin Badgers Men's Basketball |

12 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/116848881208375028445 Aston Grey Project : The Stars Are on ivyberadio.com DerickPierre Bridgette Bryant #Tessanity lalah hathaway Jordan Hill ...
The Stars Are on ivyberadio.com DerickPierre Bridgette Bryant #Tessanity lalah hathaway Jordan Hill http://ow.ly/lbJE30aK5UY
Interviews
Another reason why iVybe Is so popular among it's listeners! Some of the hottest Indie and National Artist always stop by to let us know what going on in their careers. Take a listen and see for yourself. Terri Lyne Carrington Click Here For Interview shapeimage_3_link_0. Lalah Hathaway. Click Here For ...
13 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/104444830077299057705 Jordan Hill : I have a new post up and live on my blog! We're talking contrast this week (and in the weeks to come...
I have a new post up and live on my blog! We're talking contrast this week (and in the weeks to come) and I'm super excited to see where it leads! #artjournal
Season of Contrast + A New Journal (Week of 4/2/2017)
A new season started over at Get Messy Art Journal and this time it's all about contrast! People that are familiar with me and my artwork (specifically my illustration work) will know that I'm a big fan of contrast. I like...
14 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/102151937189689943327 Ari Arc Anda :

https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-bhf28tqpc8s/WIkvzWyIsII/AAAAAAAACbk/_6cZqxojfbQFIfExaofvVccKKC1wKCAkwCJoC/w506-h750/b536b0c7d0a811df43feb8fa2e2564cb.jpg
15 days ago - Via Reshared Post - View -
https://plus.google.com/112854428205017285020 dan t : 2009 NBA Re-Draft 1. Los Angeles - Blake Griffin 2. Memphis - James Harden 3. Oklahoma City Thunder...
2009 NBA Re-Draft

1. Los Angeles - Blake Griffin
2. Memphis - James Harden
3. Oklahoma City Thunder - Stephen Curry
4. Sacramento - DeMar DeRozan
5. Minnesota - Tyreke Evans
6. Minnesota - Ricky Rubio
7. Golden State- Jeff Teague
8. New York - Brandon Jennings
9. Toronto - Jrue Holiday
10. Milwaukee - Darren Collison
11. New Jersey/Brooklyn - Patty Mills
12. Charlotte - Marcus Thornton
13. Indiana - Taj Gibson
14. Phoenix - Jordan Hill

Biggest Steal: Steph Curry/DeMar DeRozan
Biggest Bust: Hasheem Thabeet

https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/-7fYsIwk0Hnk/WOltF4hnQbI/AAAAAAAAS5w/FwBi2kzuKBsDzYCDXj8AtTOpJzh8VTg-wCJoC/w506-h750/17%2B-%2B1
16 days ago - Via Reshared Post - View -
https://plus.google.com/110588793652605844492 Jordan Hill (worldofimmensum) : This is only the beginning. I am committing to continual improvement as an #artist. Join me on my journey...
This is only the beginning. I am committing to continual improvement as an #artist. Join me on my journey, I'd love to see your process.
Who I Am (And What This Blog Is)
Long story short, I'm a storyteller. The extended version is what follows. My name is Jordan Hill, and for as long as I can remember I'v...
21 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/113067995856114559856 Jordan Hill :

Free PSD Mockup Paper Bag and Vector Lettering - TeesLab Design
Paper Bag Mockup and Bakery Hand Lettering This is a mockup that we're using to display our design for paper bag projects, so the photoshop layers optimize
21 days ago - Via Shared from the web - View -
https://plus.google.com/102193466234618954503 TornadoShelter.com : @NWStornado: Tornado Warning including Jordan Hill LA until 4:45 PM CDT
@NWStornado: Tornado Warning including Jordan Hill LA until 4:45 PM CDT
NWS Tornado on Twitter
“Tornado Warning including Jordan Hill LA until 4:45 PM CDT”
22 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/107600230514634516254 Jordan Hill :

Best LLB Study
mba university phd degree auto call insurance 2017 mba programs business degree phd degree online mba degrees phd degree So the occasions are over and you are presently considering whether to have your auto cleaned by a versa...
26 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/100927626441858956883 Jordan Hill :

Watch the video: Maui 2017
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Maui 2017
29 days ago - Via - View -
https://plus.google.com/113897927110122777224 Musick Ink : THIS IS A REQUEST THAT ON CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCES OF SUBSTANATIVE RIGHT OF HUMANS INFORMED CONSENT ...
THIS IS A REQUEST THAT ON CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCES OF SUBSTANATIVE RIGHT OF HUMANS INFORMED CONSENT THAT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS BE ASSIGNED TO CHIEF JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT FOR A REPORT IN CONFORMITY WITH 28 U.S.C.S SECTION 2509 AS JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS OF 28 U.S.C.S SECTION 257
That a unique aspect of the C.F.C. jurisdicton throughout its history has been the authority to act on congressional references of legislative proposals for compensation of individual claims,codified in 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1492:

A. Either House of Congress may refer a bill to the Chief Judge of the court for investigation and report to Congress,
B. A judge of the court is assigned to act as a hearing officer and preside over then usual proceedings,and
C. Then a three-judge review panel submits a report to Congress for its consideration and disposition of such claim for compensation.


Introduction

The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. The Immigration Reform and Control Act( IRCA) and The Fair Housing Act are both at issue on "ARREST 'OF A DWELLING'".
The prosecutor's assessment of probable cause, standing alone, does not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and is insufficient to justify restraint of liberty pending trial. Pp. 420 U. S. 116-118.The STATE OF MISSISSIPPI PROSECUTOR'S ASSESSMENT OF A MEMO:





EXHIBIT ONE IS A MEMO.
As drawn of dates EMMITT L.
SPARKMAN on June 5,2012
"Composed a memo."
As further drawn of dates Christopher B. Epps "rubber stamped the removal of 36 MONTHS on June 6, 2012 as SUBJECT top left.


36 MONTHS ARREST?
The Constitution does not require, however, judicial oversight of the decision to prosecute by information, and a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a probable cause determination. Pp. 420 U. S. 118-119.2. The probable cause determination, as an initial step in the criminal justice process, may be made by a judicial officer without an adversary hearing. Pp. 420 U. S. 119-125.
(a) The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings, and this issue can be determined reliably by the use of informal procedures. Pp. 420 U. S. 120-122.

(b) Because of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a "critical stage" in the prosecution that would require appointed counsel. Pp. 420 U. S. 122-123.




EXHIBIT TWO




A Secret EMAIL Sentencing\ for 36 months scheme or conspiracy to deprive Equality or Equal protection of MDOC SOP #18-01-01 AND MS ST CODE OF 1972, 47-5-99 TO 104 intentionally infliction wanton cruel class ANIMUS based; predicated falsely,unlawful, knowingly and upon class ANIMUS based purpose to ASSAULT WITH ANTI-PSYCHOTIC MIND ALTERING CHEMICALS IN LESS THAN 30 DAYS BUT PUBLICLY on (6)six Rule violation reports -----Evidently and apparently unlawful See,MS ST CODE OF 1972, 47-5-99 TO 104 STRICTLY PRECLUDING COMMISIONER FROM INCREASING PUNISHMENT OF STATE DISCIPLINARY OFFICER.
Dwelling of Claimant would have on June 7, 2012 changed to 785 Tyonne Drive, Prentiss, Mississippi 39474.



To the shocking, class-animus based use of ANTI-PSYCHOTIC DRUGS HEREIN THIS MATTER OF ALSO BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 15-60266 RE: SUBSTANATIVE RIGHT OF INFORMED CONSENT-- of this JOINT SESSION OF THE HOUSES, THE 2017 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 100 SENATORS AND 270 REPRESENTATIVES ---------- AKIN TO "IRCA" CLAIMANT FACES DEPORTATION TO JAIL, PSYCHIATRIC WARD, SUDDEN DEATH, DEPORTATION, IMPRISONMENT, AND\ OR " arrest 'of a dwelling."

Both the standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common law antecedents. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 412 U. S. 294-295 (1973); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (1806). The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

Page 420 U. S. 112

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 379 U. S. 91 (1964). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 175-176 (1949). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.

"These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."

Id. at 338 U. S. 176.

To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 333 U. S. 13-14 (1948):

"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection

Page 420 U. S. 113

consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."

See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 392 U. S. 222 (1968). [Footnote 12]

Maximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute all intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 379 U. S. 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 479-482 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant. See Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 334 U. S. 705 (1948). [Footnote 13]

Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification

Page 420 U. S. 114

for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships. See R. Goldfarb, Ransom 32-91 (1965); L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 51-62 (1972). Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(2), (5). When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.

This result has historical support in the common law that has guided interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 149 (1925). At common law, it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-117 (4th ed. 1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 115 U. S. 498-499 (1885). [Footnote 14] The justice of the peace

Page 420 U. S. 115

would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If not, he would be discharged from custody. 1 M. Hale, supra, at 583-586; W. Hawkins, supra at 116-119; 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 233 (1883). [Footnote 15] The initial determination of probable cause also could be reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. 2 W. Hawkins, supra at 112-115; 1 J. Stephen, supra at 243; see Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch at 8 U. S. 97-101. This practice furnished the model for criminal procedure in America immediately following the adoption of the

Page 420 U. S. 116

Fourth Amendment, see Ex parte Bollman, supra; [Footnote 16] Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17 (1795), and there are indications that the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model for a "reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 317-320 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). [Footnote 17]
In Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 273 U. S. 5 (1927), the Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a United States Attorney's information was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective. Although the Court's opinion did not explicitly state that the prosecutor's official oath could not furnish probable cause, that conclusion was implicit in the judgment that the arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 19] More recently, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 449-453 (1971), the Court held that a prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. We reaffirmed that principle in Shadwick

Page 420 U. S. 118

v. City of Tampa, 407 U. S. 345 (1972), and held that probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be determined by someone independent of police and prosecution. See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 407 U. S. 317 (1972). [Footnote 20] The reason for this separation of functions was expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a similar context:

"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not, in itself, an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication."

McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 318 U. S. 343 (1943).

In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable

Page 420 U. S. 119

cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 369 U. S. 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause. 483 F.2d at 786-787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 116, 442 F.2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 414 F.2d 1213 (1969).

III

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the determination of probable cause must be accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards -- counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses. A full preliminary hearing of this sort is modeled after the procedure used in many States to determine whether the evidence justifies going to trial under an information or presenting the case to a grand jury. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970); Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 957-967, 996-1000 (4th ed.1974). The standard of proof required of the prosecution is usually referred to as "probable cause," but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie case of guilt.

Page 420 U. S. 120

ALI, Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, Commentary on Art. 330, pp. 91 (Tent.Draft No. 5, 1972). When the hearing takes this form, adversary procedures are customarily employed. The importance of the issue to both the State and the accused justifies the presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on cross-examination. This kind of hearing also requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. And, as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures become more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly after arrest diminishes. See ALI, Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, supra, at 334.

These adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. [Footnote 21] That standard -- probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime -- traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.

"Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common law tradition,

Page 420 U. S. 121

to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property."

"* * * *"

"In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved."

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 174-175. Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 (1967).

The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination, but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. See F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime 64-109 (1969). [Footnote 22] This is not to say that confrontation and

Page 420 U. S. 122

cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause determinations in some case. In most cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause. [Footnote 23]

Because of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a "critical stage" in the prosecution that would require appointed counsel. The Court has identified as "critical stages" those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 388 U. S. 226-227 (1967). In Coleman v. Alabama, where the Court held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of an Alabama prosecution, the majority and concurring opinions identified two critical factors that distinguish the Alabama preliminary hearing from the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. First,

Page 420 U. S. 123

under Alabama law, the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no probable cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody. To be sure, pretrial custody may affect to some extent the defendant's ability to assist in preparation of his defense, but this does not present the high probability of substantial harm identified as controlling in Wade and Coleman. Second, Alabama allowed the suspect to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The Court noted that the suspect's defense on the merits could be compromised if he had no legal assistance for exploring or preserving the witnesses' testimony. This consideration does not apply when the prosecution is not required to produce witnesses for cross-examination.

Although we conclude that the Constitution does not require an adversary determination of probable cause, we recognize that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely. There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of the probable cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, for example, to make the probable cause determination at the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer, [Footnote 24]

Page 420 U. S. 124

see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 318 U. S. 342-344, or the determination may be incorporated into the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial release. In some States, existing procedures may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary hearings. Current proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest other ways of testing probable cause for detention. [Footnote 25] Whatever

Page 420 U. S. 125

procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, [Footnote 26] and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. [Footnote 27]

Page 420 U. S. 126

IV

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention, and we accordingly affirm that much of the judgment. As we do not agree that the Fourth Amendment requires the adversary hearing outlined in the District Court's decree, we reverse in part and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered in The United States Supreme Court Case of Gerstein v. Pugh
420 U.S. 103 (1975).



PROPOSED Preliminary Draft of UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT

To: USCS ,NATIONAL COURT BUILDING
717 Madison Place, NW,
Washington,DC 20439
(202)357-6400
COMPLAINT OR 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1492 HOUSE OF CONGRESS REFERRAL OF BILL TO CHIEF JUDGE OF THE COURT FOR INVESTIGATION AND REPORT
Form 5 equal access to justice act form and
Form 9(application for access to information under protective order by outside or inside counsel

JURISDICTION
1. The United States Court of Federal Claims(Fed. CI. or C.F.C.)is a United States Federal Court that years monetary claims against the United States Government wherein is currently codified in 28 U.S.C.S SECTION 1491.
2. The C.F.C. is established pursuant to Congress authority under Article One of The United States Constitution.
3. The C.F.C has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act which significantly expanded the C.F.C. jurisdiction to include all claims against the government,except tort,equitable and Admiralty claims.
4. The C.F.C.thus today has nationwide jurisdiction over most suits for mo start claims against the government and sits, without a jury to determine issues of law and facts.
5. The general jurisdiction of the C.F.C. is codified at 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1491, is over claims for just compensation for the taking of private property,refund federal taxes,military and civilian pay and allowances, and damages for breaches of contracts with the government.
6. The C.F.C. also posses jurisdiction over claims for patent and copyright infringements against the United States, as well as over certian suits by Indian tribes.
7. The C.F.C. has jurisdiction to hear both pre-award and post-award bid protests suits by unsucessful bidders on government contracts.
8. That a unique aspect of the C.F.C. jurisdicton throughout its history has been the authority to act on congressional references of legislative proposals for compensation of individual claims,codified in 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1492:
A. Either House of Congress may refer a bill to the Chief Judge of the court for investigation and report to Congress,
B. A judge of the court is assigned to act as a hearing officer and preside over then usual proceedings,and
C. Then a three-judge review panel submits a report to Congress for its consideration and disposition of such claim for compensation.
9. The C.F.C. has special jurisdiction spelled out in 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1491 it years claims for monetary damages that arise from the UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, federal statues, executive regulations,or an expressed or implied in fact contract with the United States Government,most notably under the Tucker Act.
10. The C.F.C. has concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. District Courts when the claim is for less than $10,000.00 by the provisions of 28 U.S.C.S. SECTION 1346.
11. Claims have a statue of limitations of six years from the time the claim first accrues.
12. The court has jurisdiction to accommodate the litigants as judges on the C.F.C. may hold trials at the local Federal Courthouse in Jackson, Mississipppi 501 E. Court Street where this disputes arise.

EXHUASTION OF REMEDIES PRIOR TO FILING OF THIS ACTION
13. IN 2010 or thereabout having exhuasted before A. The Military Board of Corrections and B. The Military Discharge Review Board a complaint to this court was submitted in parts : A. __________
And B._____________
14. That on JUNE 2, 2012 A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EMAIL DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED IN RETAILIATION FOR THAT 2010 submittance to this C.F.C. which violated the UNITED STATES entrenched first three Articles, the doctrine of separation of powers.
14. That as a result a "collision course" of a conspiracy to interfere with claimaint's civil rights prisoner's lawsuit and habeas corpus was initiated after completing Admistrative Grievances inside Mississippi Department of Corrections at "EMCF."
15.
Facts in support of claim(S)
A1. Although NATIONAL GUARD troops may be trained by the US ARMY and attend the same basic training and advanced individualized training as U.S. Army Reserve troops,the ultimate authority for the National Guard troops are under control and authority of the individual states I. which they serve.
A2.That I joined the Mississippi Army National Guard in December 1992 and served until November 1997.
A3. That during such time at para(A2) I received Leave and Earning Statements or ("LES") during a period of incarceration in Forrest County Jail FEBUARY 1995 to FEBUARY 1996 release.
A4. That no personally from the Mississippi Governor's office, Department of Veteran Affairs, my unit, Mississippi ARNG, or otherwise intervened during: initial arrest, bond hearings, presentence-investigation report, sentencing or otherwise AND COMPANY COMMANDER (WKER) merely stated continue to come to drill once I made MARCH 1996 drill.
A5. That I continued my secondary education as a business major at Jackson State University, Recieving the Montgomery G.I. Bill and monthly drill checks.
A6. That the sentencing order did not disqualify Mississippi Army National Guard participation and no bodily injury was intended or occurred during a FEBUARY 1995 campus shooting and resulted in a felony AGGARVATED ASSAULT conviction and sentence.
A7. That during my seeking of Change of Discharge by the Military Review Board I sought relief for Unconstitutional Double Jeopardy discharge for same conviction and other grounds for Change of Discharge to Disability of Felony conviction October 1995.6-



RELIEF SOUGHT OF THIS UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO ACT ON CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCES OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR COMPENSATION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS OF CLAIMIANT

1. Monetary Claim against the United States for the amount of :______________________For torture, and in the amount of:________________For peonage:________________
2. Declare that this the UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS has jurisdiction under 28 USCS SECTION 1491 pursuant to C.F.C RULE _ DECLARATORY JUDGEMENTS ADJUDICATION OF FACTS AND LAW UPON THE FOLLOWING:
A. Just compensation for taking of private property,to-wit:_______________________________
B. Just compensation for taking of private limbs during:
C. Just compensation to VA? for refund of federal taxes
D. Just compensation for military pay due if found discharge unlawful to this date upon:
E. Just compensation for civilian pay and allowances upon: FETTTERING?
F. Just compensation for breach of December 2,1992 ARNG elistment contract with the government.
G. The rights of the claimant to ACT ONE COPYRIGHTS AND WHETHER INFRINGEMENT OR NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES EXISTS
H.The rights of the claimant to ACT TWO COPYRIGHTS AND WHETHER INFRINGEMENT OR NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES EXISTS
I. AND any and all other right, privileges,protections against sudden death BY AND THROUGH FURTHERANCE OF ARREST FROM INDEPENDENT DWELLING WITH ADA ACCOMODATIONS,ECT. EXCLUDING VETERANS AFFAIRS PENSION.

Eric DeJuan Jones
(601)808-1430


THIS IS AN ATTACHED "ORIGINAL ACTION FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT UPON THE UNITED STATES FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSAL" OR OTHERWISE FOIA NOTICE TO DOJ OF NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS,TORTURE AND PEONAGE(NO CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH ANY UNITED NATIONS OR HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES)

TO: OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
webmanager@ohchr.org
( USDOJ FOIA OFFICER OR CONSENT DECREE REVIEW OFFICER)
FROM: ERIC DEJUAN JONES
Dated: MARCH 12, 2017--PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE ORDER OF USDOJ
IN re: 18 USCS SECTION 2340
18 U.S. Code 77 Peonage, Slavery and Trafficking in Persons
AND DUTIES OF THIS OFFICE(S) TO IMPLEMENTATE IMMINENT EXEMPTION OF POTENTIAL E-MAIL EVIDENCE OF NATIONALIST AND FOREIGN SECURITY \ SENSITIVE AND PRIVATE, OR LAW ENFORCEMENT MATTTERS AND/OR PROPSED AFFIDAVIT FCTA, ADA, FHA, AND 504 IN SUPPORT OF COMPENSATION AND OTHER RELIEF
PROPOSED CONSENT AGREEMENT AND NON-WAIVER OF ANY AND ALL PROTECTIONS DUE OF THE UNITED STATES OR MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONS,CODES,LAWS,RULES OR OTHERWISE
That I am the human individual solely affected and no corporate or charity claims except as shown below in dictation and GOOD STANDING CHARTER REVISION 2017 AS apply hereto day 12, of March,2017,sworn,deposed and recorded as:
1.That I on or about June 2012 to December 2013 TORTURE, DEFINED AT 18 USCS SECTION 2340 under jurisdiction(S) of the United States, WHEREAFTER the United States had become a party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [Convention enter into Force with respect to United States November 20, 1994,Treaty Doc.100?20.] I,being hereinafter "victim" to factual and actual Torture and DECEMBER 2013 THROUGHOUT FEBUARY 13,2015 SUBJECTED TO HUMAN CLONING AND TRAFFICKING,SLAVERY, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,PEONAGE,AND FORCED LABOR IN VIOLATION OF18 U.S.C.S 77.
2. That I on FEBUARY 13, 2013 THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, BY AND THROUGH ITS THEN APPOINTED COMMISSIONER MR. CHRISTOPER B. EPPS, JUDGE PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL, AND OTHER OFFICIALS ACTIONS BEING UNKNOWN UNTIL APRIL 2014 FEDERAL COURT HEARING AN FEDERAL TORT CLAIM ACT LETTER WAS SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
Other Official Defined

A. MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED THERETO " DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS
(Notice of Separate Claims Court matter:Without floor privileges;see Robert C. Byrd," Lobbying the Senate,1789-1989:Address History of Senate(Washington,D.C.Government Office,1991).Lobbying as a person hired by groups or organizations with particular interests to convince members of Congress to pass or defeat legislation. They may work for business corporations, labor unions,[GENESIS CHAPTER 39 Laban Countries],executive branch agencies,foreign governments,or private or public interest groups; for example:
" FRUAD Question: If I register an account with Flagship Merchants but learn afterwards that they have no dealing with SSI RECIPIENTS AND CLOSE THE PRIMARY ACCOUNT, WHILE LOCAL BANKER CLOSED THE ACCOUNT WHEN FLAGSHIP SENT FOR $85.00 ,AS FLAGSHIP WAS NEVER GIVEN THE NEW ACCOUNT NUMBER, IS IT FRUAD FOR THE BANKER TO ALLOW FLAGSHIP ACCESS TO THE NEW ACCOUNT? OR DID FLAGSHIP REQUEST WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEW AÇCOUNT? PLEASE DETECT FRUAD IN THIS AND THE BELOW MATTERS.

THIS IS NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE AN ACTION IN SMALL AND/OR UNITED STATES CLAIM COURT OR THUS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI EQUIVALENT STATE INSTITUTION OR NOTICE OF PRE-BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT("FAA")
That this Complaint is written in purpose that this is a claim of unconscionability of June 7, 2007 biological and birth-rights,current demand for FORMAL WILL AND TRUST,AND separation of Non-For Profit ORGANIZATION: Having prior to April 9,2008 heard MISSISSIPPI EDUCATION SECRETARY MR. HANK BOUNDS SPEAK AT PRENTISS NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTE LIBRARY, DID THEREAFTER NAME IN 2007 DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS, ORIGINALLY AS INTERNALLY OF THE FOUNDER ERIC DEJUAN JONES TO BE A PLANNED EDUCATIONAL OUTLET BUT ALSO FAMILY UPON FUNDAMENTAL OBLIGATION AND NON-RECIEPT OF ANY INHERITANCE,ROYALITIES,OR OTHER RECORDS OF FINANCIAL OR PECUNIARY, " RIGHT TO KNOW" OF EXISTENCE; HENCE DEATH OF MY DA(D), WILLIAM VERNOM BILL CROSBY, VETERAN OF WORLD WAR TWO AND PRIOR PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER OR FUNDRAISER OF PRENTISS NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTE (III) Or Otherwise thereabout having acquired separate of School or College interests,set forth at Jefferson Davis County Chancery Court,PROPERTY AND MINERAL RIGHTS AND\OR DEEDS OR PAPERS OF INTERESTS OF SECURITY FINANCIAL OR OTHERWISE PRESERVED, VALUABLE AND DUE TRANSFER IMMEDIATELY OF SUCH OWNERSHIP PER BIRTH-RIGHTS OR UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT FOURTHTEENTH PROHIBITION FROM PROPERTY INTERESTS OF HEIR BIOLOGICAL FATHER, WITHOUT BEING FIRST AT MINIMUM PROCEEDURAL DUE to "unconscionability of lunacy of Shirley Mae Jones,who now this the below date is sane to testify in this matter" Wherefore, pursuant to "THE UNIFORM INTERESTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT" WHEREAS THIS COMPLAINT AND INITIAL INFORMAL SEIZURE NOTICE AND REQUEST OF CUSTODIAL OPERATIVE CONTROL BY AND THROUGH CHARITABLE REQIRED OF MODERNATION IN CONTINUING STANDARDS OF HISTORICAL EDUCATIONAL-FAMILY HEIRS CONTROL VERSUS CORPORATE USURP FUNDS AND INVESTMENT DERIVABLE PROPERTIES,WITHOUT RIGHT DUES OR INTERESTS, ROYALITIES, NOR PROOF AND DISCLOSURE OF THAT PROOF THEIR DOCUMENTATION,RECORDS,AND NORMS OF DECENCY IN 2017 PUBLIC INFORMATION STANDARDIZED DISCLOSURE, ELECTRONIC DATA NEED FOR COMPLILATIONS, AND SWIFT PUBLIC SHARING, TOURING OR WALK-IN INSPECTION,OBSERVATIONS, AND TRANSFER OF FAMILY PROPERTIES CONTROL AND SECURED RECORD-,KEEPING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO BIOLOGICAL SON, ERIC DEJUAN JONES, FOUNDER OF ORGANIZATION DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS,INC.JUNE 7,2007 OR THERE ABOUT
,who but for an Email Scheme 87% handled of Regions Bank, some seven years,had it not been for Official Misconduct seen at EXHIBIT ONE, THE OFFICIAL STATE BLATANT POLICY ACT OF JUDICIALLY KNOWN 'EMAIL SENTENCING RESULTING IN 36 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND INDIVIDUAL, THUS HEREBY MADE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION,DISCLOSURE,AUTHENICATION, DONATIONATIONS, GIFTS THEREUPON, DURING CERTIFICATION BY PARTIES ABOVE WHETHER BY REPARATIONS OR UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT FIVE PROVISIONS FOR JUST COMPENSATION DUE AT LIKE SUCH HISTORICAL PRESERVATIONS INDOCTRINATIONS OF HARRIET TUBMAN 2017 BUSINESS INTERNET RAILROAD FROM CRIME,POVERTY,IGNORANCE,SHAME, AND PITY THAT THOSE WHO HAVE ENDURE WITH STRENGHT SHALL TRIUMP" as thus 2007 vision of My Father and/Grandfather(s) shall continue after thus that 36 months delay as important documents herein set forth.


INTRODUCTION OF THE LAST TESTAMENT,PROCLAMATION,WILL AND INSTRUCTIONS TO TRUSTEE OR TRUSTEE FOR ESTATE OF PMINK-SPECIAL NEEDS
FORMAL- TRUST AND BIO OF WILLIAM VERNOM BILL CROSBY, PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER AND ADOPTED SON OF MR. AND MRS.J.E. JOHNSON, FIRST-BORN ERIC
DEJUAN JONES

".....born ,September 8, 1975 wherefrom April 8,2008 til FEBUARY 13, 2015 it took me to get free from JURISDICTION of Mississippi Department of Corrections,in light that on June 25, 2003 ole judge Eubanks promised me a six year sentence to get me to plead where the congressman said I ain't got to admit no facts just say yes sir and the judge would state on the the record it was only a six year sentence, had had a suppresion hearing but court had not ruled, defamation claims wasn't working, and the judge knew about them at the jail threatnng me I had wrote it in my Family of Eric De'Juan Jones suit, nevertheless it sounded like six years when the judge, pronounced term of imprisonment, as the judge and knew I had to get a hearing on my '84 Camaro so I could hold the facts til then I figure and since I was only nine months left to serve on probation in Febury 2006 my friend around your way and I made you a Grandson DERIAN CHARLES EDWARD LOFTIN, boy done turned ten now, but back in 2007 went me an EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER AND CALLED MY CHARITY DA COACH KIM- CROSBY PROJECTS, sort of after you CROSBY DA(D), I thought, but although no man or woman knew or know what our vision is, I dedicated to my dad this day so where do I start Your Honor, pop?"
".........Well dad sound like to me he said sixteen years with ten suspended,didn't hear him oral pronounce no terms or conditions of probation,so on and through 2006 I believed the ten years was invalid, all I need to do was ask the judge but unfortunately I think your honor destroyed the transcript cause now days at revocation of probation hearings you get a final hearing on transcripts cause a lady be typing, but pops if you done already put the belt on me AIN'T NO SENSE IN BEGGING AND PLEADING THEN, cause you've not only decided but after on your decisions, don't know how thatEmail scam gone turn out, but laws for revocation already interpeted so I'm gonna get on up off that issue cause no process due prior to revocation on those transcripts but it okay dad, I will tell you bout the "nuthouse prison" later by Honor due it's 2017 SUPERBOWL SUNDAY PATRIOTS WIN,WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT IN, I'm trying to get my 'Will' together herein,just slowed down to commencerate the day, and our legacy in quotations"
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JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE [CHECKS AND BALANCE OF MISSISSIPPI UNITED STATES COURT HANDLING OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS]
USCA 14 PROTECTED CLASS PRIVILLEGES OF GENDER,PURSUIT OF FINANCIAL TRADE,COMMERENCE,AND INDIGENCY PUBLIC EMANCIPATION, UNCONSCIOUSLY due but for Family Shunning or lunacy and religious presecution ; demanded honor of Educable and Educational Historical Beacons, and ULTIMATE PURPOSE TO BECOME (WITH WORDS OF SPIKE LEE PRODUCTIONS AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCATES OF "HAGGAR-SECRETCY SENSITIVENESS" BUT WORK OF BIRTH BY BROTHEL PERMISSIONS, OR INVOLUNTARY,LACKING NOT ALSO PLANNED CHILD REARING AND OTHER EVADED OR UNDOCUMENTED , IN POSITIONS OF TRUST,, IN POSITIONS OF BUSINESS VISIONS,DERIVITIVES OF VISIONS PROPERLY FOUNDATED FOR RECORD-KEEPING OF BIRTH RIGHT COMMON LAW FUTURE,IMMINENTLY AND BIOLOGICALLY EXPECTED AND REQUIRED IN DEATH , LIKE THAT OF WILLIAM CROSBY AS DECORATED AT " PNI WILLIAMS VERNOM "BILL"CROSBY CAFETERIA AS SEPERATION OF WILLIAM' personal and separately WWII CASH,BENEFITS,INVESTMENTS AND FORCED FAMILY LIKE RE-FINANCING , WHEREIN WITHOUT DUE CONSCIOUS OR "HAGGAR-SECRETCY" INSTITUTIONALLY AND RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT THEREOF AT OR NEAR 1975,SEPTEMBER 8TH THOUGHOUT DEATH OF BIOLOGICAL DAD, AT OR NEAR 1983 OR MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC RECORDS ACT OF 1983 AND ANY LAW OFFSET FEDERALLY BY BEST "PROFITS OF DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS 2017 ORGANIZATIONAL POWERS TO SUE FOR LINEAGE OF "HAGGAR-LIKE COMMON-LAW INDIGENCY LIFETIME OWNERSHIP SECURITY INTERESTS OF "HAGGAR-LIKE COMMON-LAW SECRETCY BIRTHS OF ESTABLISHMENT HEIRACHACY OF PRIVATE RELIGIOUS NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL WOULD at said time permit cloaking and it's continuation thereof but for atop FRUAD DETECTION AND IMMINENTLY DUE AMMESTY-LIKE TRUSTEES,OFFICERS,DIRECTORS,OR OTHERWISE INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS, NOW DEEMED "ANY AND ALL ADMINISTRATORS AND STUDENTS, INDUSTRIAL OR NORMAL RELIGOUS PRIVATE, CANDIDATES, ENTERING OCTOBER 2,1974 THROUGHOUT PRESENT TRANSITION AND CURRENT INDIVUAL, CHURCH OR COMMUNITY BANKING OF SAID PERSONAL OR HEIR- INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICALY OF REGIONS BANK, STATE OF ALABAMA INCORPORATED if any such existed AT LAST PUBLIC DAY OF OCTOBER 2014 DESCENDING TO 2006 FEBUARY,1 2006 PHYSICAL FREEDOM OF SON, ERIC DEJUAN JONES, LAST BIOLOGICAL BIRTHRIGHT HEIR AND GUARDIAN TRUSTEE OF DERIAN AND DENARIO, RECORD KEEPING AND PUBLIC EMANCIPATION OR ANNUALLY\QUARTERLY PUBLISHING OF ACURAL ACCOUNTABLE MONEY,TENDER,CASH OR INCOME PAYABLE UPON AVAILABILITY ,DECREE AS A.$15.10 PER HOUR MINIMUM WAGES JUSTLY DUE 20 YEAR OLD HEIR,FOR SPAN OF DAY AT 24-HOURS NON- STOP ,DISPURSED WEEKLY,FOR LIFESPAN OF BIRTHRIGHT AND ITS ENFORCEABLE PROTECTED RIGHT TO SUE AS A CORPORATION, AND FOR THE LIFESPAN OF 10 -YEAR OLD HEIR ,20-YEAR OLD HEIR ,EACH MONDAY CONFER AS PEACEFULLY AS POSSIBLE,TO RENDER AT $7.55 PER HOUR ,A 42 HOUR WEEK, SOCIAL SECURITY,FEDERAL INCOME TAXES,AND FICA(WITH AN EXCLUSIVE-HAGGAR TAX WITHHOLDING OF 10% OF FULL WEEKLY WAGES ,THEREAFTER WITHHOLDING PRINCIPAL IN FULL 42 WAGE TOTAL OF TEN YEAR HEIR,ADDING TOTAL OF AT 20% HEIR
HOSPITAL BUILDING FUND,WHEREIN TRUSTEE-ELECTED SHALL RECIEVE NOTICE ALONG WITH, INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS IN THIS EMANCIPATION AND INITIALIZATION OF MY INTERNAL AFFIRMATIVE VISION, GENDER EQUALITY PRIVILLEGES INVOKED SEEKING RELIGIOUS FINANACIAL SECURITY OF BEST INTERESTS OF heirs at HAGGAR-LIKE disadvantages prejudiced by INDIGENCY violative OF USCA ONE RIGHT TO DISCLOSURE AND KNOW HEIRS, AND TRUSTEES AFTER DEATH OF NEXT KIN USE OF ANY AND ALL, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, ESTABLISHMENTS ,VICES, OR CONTROL,INPUT AND DERIVE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL BIRTHRIGHT HEIRS, AT MINIMUM REQUIRED OF AT MINIMUM 18-YEARS CHILD FUNDING,EDUCATION, DISCIPLINE OR SECURITY OF MINOR CHILDREN,RIGHTFUL HEIRS,OF DEEDS AND ESTABLISHMENT ,BUILDINGS and Components of PROFIT INVESTIGATIONS,RESEARCH AND DEVELOPEMENT, AND IMMINENT USES THERE OF "A CLOSED-NON CANDITDATE ACCEPTING EDUCATIONAL OUTLET OF ADMISSIONS AT COST FOR ANY NORMAL OR INDUSTRIAL RELIGION PRIVATE OR KNOWN GENDER EQUALITY COURSES OR "INTERNET, ELECTRONIC, OR PHYSICAL HIGHWAY TO THEREBY TRAVEL,ACCESS, IMPLEMENT,OPERATE AND DEMAND PERMITTANCE TO TRAVEL,SUCH HIGHWAYS RIGHTLY DUE OF BIRTHRIGHT HAGGAR-LIKE DEPRIVIATION OF FAMILY HEIR SUPPORT, EQUATING AND CONSTITUTING A USCA WOMEN SUFFURAGE MATTER OR UNDUE INDIGENCY REVERSE DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED ACTS OF ORGANIZATION, DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS,FOUNDER, AND HEREBY ATTESTED AND NOTIFIED OF INTENT TO SEEK A RESEARCHED AND DEVELOPED , A SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST, GENERAL PRIVATE TRUST, RIGHTFULLY CALLED "PRISON MUSIC INK" AS WARNING WOULD IMPLY, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WHETHER ACTUALLY WRITTEN HEREIN, OR OBLIGATED AS FEDERAL OR STATE RECORD KEEPING DISPICT AS CURRENT OR PAST, HEIGHT OF HEIRS OF WILLIAM VERNOM BILL CROSBY, SEPARATE OF ADOPTED PARENTS OR JOINTLY , WOULD HAVE PASSED TO BIOLOGICAL NON-ARBITRARILRY POLITICALLY OR OTHERWISE ADOPT "CHICO RODNEY CROSBY" WHOSE SECURITY OF ADOPTED, NON-BIOLOGICAL HEIR SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN ALLOCATED,IN SECRETCY,JURISDICTION PREMISES PROTECTTED,SO PROPSED FOR LITIGATION AND FAMILY CONFERENCE.
YOU MUST,ASSERT YOUR RIGHTS OR DEMAND PROTECTIONS AS ABOVE NOTIFIED. When on or about January 22, 2016 per EIN NO. 32-0199974 the first and only authorized of the Original Principal Incorporator attempted to start over in the Educational original format through music experiences since incorporating and finalizing a State prison term, which is under LITIGATION by myself in Eric De'Juan Jones vs. CHRISTOPER B. Epps,and eight other defendants at No. 15-60266 in The United States Fifth Circuit Court Of Appeals, and thus same person Christopher B. Epps at The United States of America vs. Christopher B. Epps case number unknown, as shown at the indictment therein had numberous accounts at Regions Bank, wherein but for unconscionability to Organization Principal Incorporator until 2014 or after reading of the said indictment was such discovered BY PURCHASE FOR $17.50 wherein the results of that investigation is unknown and beyond my knowledge or authority sought at ERIC DEJUAN JONES VS. MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS AND ATTRONEY GENERAL FOR MISSISSIPPI SAAG LESILE D. MILLER, NO. 3:16-CV,-0023-KS-DCJ ,SEE SECOND MOTION FOR STAY OF COMVICTION AND\OR CONTROLLING ORDER. AND RECUSAL SCRUNITY, EXPECTED TO BE FILED ON FEBUARY 6, 2017,ATTACHED IN FULL, THAT TRUST AND WORTHWHILE POSITIONS OF TRUST BE HELD IN DICTA:
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IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 2017 SESSIONS



ERIC DEJUAN JONES
LOBBIST,DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS

SENATE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING OR RECIEPT NUMBER:_____________*___________DATED____*__________*

CITY OF PRENTISS AND SAAG LESILE D. MILLER FOR MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE RESPONDENTS


PETITIONER'S SEEKING SENATE CLAIM COURT FURTHERANCE BY ' DUAL NOVEMBER 2014 AND 2015 ARRESTS FROM DWELLING PLACE FOR RETURN TO TORTURE AND ATTEMPTED PERMANENT AGE DISCRIMINATION ASSUALT ON MOTHER AGE 69 SCHEME REMOVAL FROM DWELLING


COMES NOW, ERIC DEJUAN JONES, PO BOX 188, PRENTISS,MISSISSIPPI 39474.
PURSUANT THE UNITED STATES SENATE JURISDICTION AT 28 U.S.C. 542 RESOLUTION OF COMPENSATION CLAIMS , THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND "IRCA",TO-WIT:

1. On FEBUARY 1, 2017 ALISHA OF AMERICAN MUNICIPAL SERVICES CONTACTED THE PETITONER THAT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS WHO IS RESPONDENT IN THIS MATTER REPRESENTED BY SAAG LESILE D. MILLER IN THIS PETITIONER AT (601)808-1430 TO DEMAND $375.00 FOR A FINE OF $300.00 IMPOSED AT CONVICTION AND OTHER TERMS--MAILED TO THE PETIONER WHO HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL TO THE CIRCUIT COURT.
2.ACCORDING TO ANSWER OF SAAG LESILE D. MILLER "PETIONER DO NOT HAVE AN APPEAL OF THE MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS CONVICTION BEFORE THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT."
3.Petitioner transverse while "oratory" merely points out as within the Petition(1) "because the Circuit Court Clerk for Jefferson Davis County "required $300.00 fine cost placement or appeal cost" before as COMITY of Federal Courts

a.)RECIEVE and stamp all information PAUPERIS affidavit,motions and document,appeal,complaints, habeas corpus, or other And
b.) Assign a docket number,judge Who then decides whether INFORMA PAUPERIS STATUS or other payments must be made.
4. That in fact if a Federal Clerk demanded payment to accept a appeal or otherwise instead of the steps at para 3, it may constitute grounds for removal from office.
5.The petition (1)even includes the document as offered to Jefferson Davis County Circuit Clerk as appeal from the mailed sentence and fine.
6. That the sincerity of this misdemeanor arises before this Court PREMISED upon:
A.The Circuit Clerk's refusal to honor indigents right of the judge to decide whether INFORMA PAUPERIS will grant AS THERE MUST IN COMMON LAW BE AT LEAST ONE LEVEL OF APPEAL AND OTHER CLEAR PROCEEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDENT, TO-WIT:
I.) The USCA FOUR LEVIES A PENALTY OF PERJURY AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS WHO;
A.arrest without a warrant and B. make an affidavit of facts and underlying circumstances knowingly and INTENTIONALLY False on Material Facts.
7.That while this misdemeanor conviction of a fine and threat of imprisonment for only six months is exhibited at the sentencing order:
A. An unbiased court would look closer at the clause of simple ASSUALT IN MISSISSIPPI ON PERSONS OVER 65 YEARS OF AGE AND FIND THE PENALTY IS ACTUALLY 65 YEARS!
B. That an unbiased court could utilize the PROCEEDURAL Habeas Corpus Rules for evidentiary hearings, discovery, and conclusive criminal prosecution in this matter if it is found:
I)Arresting Officer Robert Browning is a decorated and seasoned officer with training and experience in many WARRANTLESS ARRESTS WHICH WITHIN 48 HOURS REQUIRES A MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS JUDGE TO SIGN A WARRANT BASED ON A SWORN AFFIDAVIT,
Ii.)That the arresting officer has no duty to protect and rationally if the Petitioner had not committed Simple ASSUALT in the officers sight, that rationally any 911 call can be investigated to find the truth and insure he protects himself against perjury accusations,
iii.)That this was proceeded with a motion to dismiss for false affidavit by Robert Browning,
Yet the Municipal Prosecutor Mr. Buffington DID NOT CALL ME MOTHER AS A WITNESS IN THE ACTUAL COURT CASE BUT DID NOT NOLLE PROSSE THE CHARGE, BASED UPON KNOWING HE WOULD PRESENT PERJURY OF SHIRLEY MAE JONES IN THE MATTER.
8.THAT IN ACCORD WITH THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE OF HECK VS. HUMPHREY'S (CITATION UNKNOWN A PETIONER INTERNET SERVCES IS CURRENTLY OFF) which District Court Judge Carlton W. Reeves in Case No. 3:13-cv-1039 and No. 3:13-cv-0982-CWR-LRA (through motions to consolidate repeatedly applied Heck to state This United States could not compensate 36 months taken by email until that 36 months are declared unlawfully deprived).


9. That as such 36 months taken by email whence United States Prosecuting Attorney "has formally indicted one defendant CHRISTOPER B. EPPS" however no FEDERAL OR STATE AUTHORITY HAS EXECUTIVELY,JUDICALLY, OR LEGISLATIVELY took AFFRIMATIVE duty or actions in the Handling of the Email effects of 36 months upon the PETITIONER NOW SERVED, BUT FAR FROM MOOT AS THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AT NO. 16-60266 IS ASK TO RECONSIDER EN BANC THAT SUIT ALTHOUGH SET FOR TRIAL NOVEMBER 2014 WAS SUDDENLY DISMISS AT SAID DEFENDANTS ARREST FOR FAILURE TO EXHUAST PRLA REMEDIES.
10. That this 36 month scandal was claim in full as FORCED PSYCHIATRY THROUGH POLITICAL POWERS ABUSE IN A RECENT ACTION BEFORE THIS COURT AGAINST THE STATE AND OTHER DEFENDANTS WAS ORDERED TO PAY FEES OF $400.00 TO PROSECUTE WHICH AT THIS TIME PETITIONER WOULD DECLINE FOR SAFETY PURPOSES AND RISK OF POLITICAL ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY.
11. That the Honorable Keith Starrett the DISTRICT COURT Assigned to the above styled case upon information and belief have presided over NUMBEROUS matters before this the United States Court including the actual criminal appeal or revocation appeal that arose from Political Subdivision of Lawrence County, being selected from the adjacent district to arise to Federal Court status.
12. That since the 2008 revocation before Judge PRENTISS G. HARRELL, on 4-4-08 a spiral of presumed truthfulness of JUDGE PRENTISS G. HARRELL in regard to court room DISRESPECT has evolved into a sham and mockery of facts that any person appearing before our Judicial authorities decorum would cringe upon and suffer an appealing therefrom a shameful denial of any request,motions, or actions unperfected.
13. That during appeal from the Revocation order of ten year JUDGE PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL STIPULATED TO THE MISSISSIPPI COURT OF APPEALS:
A. The Revocation transcripts are in the record when in fact THOSE TRANSCRIPTS HAVE NOT BEEN REVIEWED BY ANY ATTORNEY GENERAL SAAG FOR PROCESS DUE AT ALL REVOCATIONS AND WHETHER THAT PROCESS WAS GIVEN THE PETITIONER.
B. The Attorney General's office acknowledge that not transcript was in the record but proceeding with the courtroom misconduct to prejudice to outcome whereby the Mississippi Court of Appeals was so overwhelmed that a decision came down WITH FULL DISREGARD FOR SCRUTINY of appealate transcripts from the Revocation hearing as did the United States Courts OFFICIALS without ordering the transcripts.
14. That in this particular matter Petitioner witnessed during the Municipal of PRENTISS trial for simple assualt that the SAME JUDGE UNKNOWN WHO SIGNED THE WARRANT--WAS HANDWRITTING A "TRANSCRIPT" AS NO VOICE TRANSCRIBER , STENOPGRAPHER, COURT REPORTER, OR ANY OTHER PERSON MAKING AN OFFICIAL RECORD WAS PRESENT TO PRESERVE OFFICIAL IN COURT TESTIMONY.
15. That in light this charge carries 65 years in simple assualt is found upon person over 65 in age with this said could have been picked up by the DISTRICT Attroney of the District AND IN HINDSIGHT OF THE NOVEMBER 2014 SEIZURE OF PETITIONER FROM A MEDICAL CLINIC without a warrant or conviction thereupon PETITIONER WAS CAUSED TO SERVE 75 DAYS IN MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRCTIONS AT THIS POLITICALLY UNSTABLE CHANGE OF COMMISSIONER.
16.THE ARREST BUT NON-CONVICTION For November 2014 public profanity undocumented by affidavit or witnesses of two persons and disorderly conduct levied upon the PETITIONER from Jefferson Davis County Jail----At finality of THE 36 MONTHS EXCESSIVELY AND PROLONGMENT OF IMPRISONMENT BY THE EMAIL SENTENCING scheme---IT SHOULD BE NOTED PETITIONER only had one week left on the extended sentence to meet his probation officer and that 36 months extension by email would have ended.
17. That MDOC USED THE MUNICIPAL CHARGES AS PREDICATE TO REVOKE " ERS " BUT REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY APRIL TAYLOR AS APPOINTED THE CITY WOULD NOT ISSUE ANY DOCUMENTS AS TO THE UNDERLYING CHARGES ONLY A NOLLE PROSSE BY MUNICIPAL PROSECUTER MR. BUFFINTON after PETITIONERS FEBRUARY 13, 2015 CONCLUSION OF MDOC JURISDICTION.
18. That as a result of previously no documents or convictions as subject for the predicate MDOC 75 days of imprisonment Petitioner believed he had ONE YEAR FROM FEBRUARY 13, 2015 to sue for false imprisonment, but that false imprisonment was only one act and does not SUE FOR PARTICIPATION ON THE ACTUALLY EMAIL IN BELIEF THAT THE MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS WAS "ACTING OTHER OFFICIALS. "
19. When this NOVEMBER 2015 ARREST OCCURED WITHOUT ANY APPEAL PROCESS OR INDIGENT PROTECTIONS IN VIOLATION OF USCA FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER, BEST DRAFTED AS:
"Right for federal habeas corpus investigation and in court review of a potential 65-year framing of Petitioner,Eric DeJuan Jones,for charge of simple ASSUALT,WHICH YET CAN AT CURRENT OR UP TO THREE YEARS FROM NOW IN SECRETCY AND WITHOUT TRANSCRIPTIONS OR ADVERSERIAL TESTING OF PROFESSIONAL ATTORNEY BE CALLED BEFORE GRAND JURY AND PROSECUTED TO DERIVE A FELON INDICTMENT, REQUIRE BOND, AND RESULT IN PRE-TRIAL IMPRISONMENT,WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE A. INTERNET HIGHWAY OR B.ELECTRONIC BANKING HIGHWAY, ULTIMATE LY SENTENCED TO A MAXIMUM,'ASUALT OF MOTHER 65-YEARS STATE OF MISSISSIPPI PRISON TERM OF HARD LABOR, GIVEN BY THIS SAME CIRCUIT JUDGE, OR DISTRICT THAT HEREIN, IN VIOLATION OF USCA 14 INDIVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION REFUSED " USCA ONE ACCESS TO COURT DOCKETS" by and through verbal blockage and refusal of current Circuit Court Clerk Clint Langley rightfully due state INDIGENCY appealable 'opportunity' in that light,given STANDING, JUDICIARY POWERS AND REMEDIES AT THIS STAGE OF A POTENTIAL ONGOING STATE FELONY INVESTIGATION, AS any and all payments,could be used as evidence of guilt in future criminal proceedings of the same Circuit,CLEARY PROHIBITED.

AVAILABLE OF STATE COURTS THE PETITIONER FINDS THAT FOR OVER FIVE MONTHS THE COURT HAS TOOK NO ACTION IN A MATTER THAT---"gives the Municipal undue USCA FOUR power to seize the PETITIONER for lack of payment of $300.00 that's now $375.00 due to:
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL SERVICES, PO BOX 118312, CARROLTON,TEXAS 75011
Which as shown by the attached reciept Petitioner shall comply under threat of arrest to payment of FIFTY BUCKS A MONTHS IN LIEU OF:
A. Internet Highway Dire Disadvantaged Breakdown $142.00 fees Windstream,FEBRUARY 6, 2017;
B. Consumer Protectable Stock Highway VECHILE Breakdown Cash Cow $105.00, FEBUARY 6,2017 payment ,and Exclusive VIP REWARDS investment preservation of Any and all interests at PARA A, above;see EXHIBIT ONE THREE CONSUMER DOCUMENTS, USCA 14;42 USCA SECTION 1985 (1) DEPRIVIATION OF $148.00 VIP REWARDS POTENTIAL PROVOCATIONAL INTENT AT USCA 14 LOANER CAR PROCESSES DUE AT EXHIBITS VIP REWARDS EXPLANATION Of EQAUL APPLICATION OR PROTECTIONS OF SERVICE AT MERCEDES-BENZ IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI SERVICE DEPARTMENT.


C. CURRENT AND REPEATED BANKING ELECTRONIC INDIGENT SWEEPING PRACTICE DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS, AS-LIKE PROBALLY AFFECTING 4/5 th of AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THOSE ETHINICY GROUPS OF THE DEMOGRAPHICAL UNKNOWN IRS TAX FILING OR MERE BANKING ACCOUNT-HOLDERS A POLICY-NOW RESEARCHED AND DEVELOPED AS:
"No Money,Lose $36.00 dollars versus No money,No momentum change; as Policy of Regions Banking blanket-sweeping Over-draft minimum level throughout maximum level,$36.00 dollars effects millions of such persons,As have Currently CAUSE BLOCKAGE OR FREEZE-LIKE EFFECTS ON FEDERAL FUNDS OR REHABILITATIVE ACTS and continue to disadvantage PMINK, thereby herein or otherwise should be: 1. Discontinued as Regions Banking blanket-sweeping unfair freezing-blockage of TO-WIT: TRADES INVOLVING ELECTRONIC CURRENCY COMMERNCE AS INTERNET HIGHWAYS,PHYSICAL HIGHWAYS,AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY INDIGENCY PROTECTIONS DUE OF PROCESS HIEGHTENED FOR FAIRNESS AND RATIONATIONALITY VERSUS ERROR AND $36.00 PROFITS TO BANKS, ALIKE REGIONS.
D. The impending physical security of transportation inoperable and imminent towage from PRENTISS local housing projects, FAIR HOUSING ACT CLAIM admiss loss of Use of Internet Highway Access, revealations of PMINK SPECIAL NEED TRUST, A FORMAL WILL-TRUSTEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PMINK LIFELONG LEGACY AND RESEACH AND DEVELOPEMENT OF 1972-1988 IRC OR IRS CODE OR TAX LAW AFFECTING MY PROTECTION AND CONTROL OR SEIZURE OF BIOLOGICAL SON OF WILLIAM VERNOM BILL CROSBY OR ORGANIZATION : DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS, as such for USCA ONE and FOURTEEN gender equality claims would ask this Court consideration, that JURISDICTION thereof furthering of economy that notices or otherwise further thereon shall be set forth,
AS A RESULT THIS DOCKETED CIVIL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FROM A DO NOT CONTAIN
"ANY RECIEPT OF PAYMENT TO AMERICAN MUNICIPAL OR MUNICIPAL OF PRENTISS " or STATE OF MISSISSIPPI RESPONDENTS in this matter as personal security,NOT WHISTLEBLOWING, NOT INVESTIGATION OF FEDERAL BANKING CORRUOTION, AND NOT DESIRE OF LITIGATION EXPENSES AT PERSONAL SECURITY RISKS OF NO INSURED VECHILCULAR TRANSPORTATION, INTERNET TRANSPORTATION, or ELECTRONIC CURRENCY TRANSPORTATION, as such Expedition of this matter is sought.
20. That this second motion and facts 1-19 above is made that THE COURT CAN SCRUTINIZE ITSELF FOR RECUSAL AND TAKING CONTROL OF THE MATTER PETITIONER TERMS "TWO NOVEMBERS 2014 AND 2015 " LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS AND ISSUES IN THIS INSTANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS GRANTING THE BELOW SPECIFIC REMEDIES.

RELIEF SOUGHT
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PENDING TIME THIS COURT TO SCHELDULE INJUNCTIVE HEARING

***INITIALLY THAT PURSUANT TO FRCP RULE 65 A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WILL IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT NOTICE ISSUE TO MUNICIPAL OF THE CITY OF PRENTISS ,MAYOR; BOARD OF ALDERMEN, CITY COUNSEL OR PROSECUTOR,AND ANY AND ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT MEN OR WOMEN EMPLOYED AND EMPOWERED TO MAKE ARREST OF ERIC DEJUAN JONES OR WIRE TAP OR ORALLY INTERCEPT COMMMUNICATIONS,BY TRAP DEVICE, PEN REGISTER, OR OTHER 18 USCS SECTION 2131 ( by no means therein )METHOD OF TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE AND AT THE DISPOSAL OF SAID MUNICIPAL OR ITS AGENTS TO CEASE,REFRAIN,ENJOIN, AND STOP IMMEDIATELY ANY AND ALL INTENT TO UTILIZE IN ANY MANNER THE USCA AMENDMENT FOUR AND FOURTEENTH EQUALITY DUE AT RACE,INDIGENCY,GENDER,MENTAL ILLNESS, OR ORTHERWISE PROTECTED CLASSES AND SUCH TEMPORARY RETRAINING ORDER WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT PENDING DATE___________AND TIME______________AND PLACE________________to be determined by the Court. That PRELIMINARY-PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEARING AND\OR evidentiary hearing shall be predated by ten days advance disclosure in full upon the PETITIONER and the COURT of the following:

1.November 2014 reports, affidavits, and all MDOC DOCUMENTS, OR RVRS -RULE VIOLATION REPORTS,AND OTHER DOCUMENT OF USCA 4 AND 14 CONSTITUTIONALITY CAN BE VALIDATED WHAT PROCESS WAS DUE AND THAT THAT DUE PROCESS WAS GIVEN THE PETITIONER DUE AT INITIAL SEIZURE AND THROUGHOUT THE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT;
2. November 2015 reports,affidavits,and PAPERS OR COURT DOCKET ; THAT THE INITIAL PETITION CAN BE HEARD AND ALSO RESOLVED AT THAT PRELIMINARY -PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEARING;
3. May 22,2012 pen registers,trap devices, and other email electronic RECIEPTof PETITIONER PENDING JUNE 7,2012 PRISON DISCHARGE AND OBJECTIONS OR OTHERWISE BANNISHMENT LIKE ACTS OR RESPONSES MAY BE RECORDED****(THIS INITIALLY YOUR HONOR(S) THAT A LONG LIST OF PERSON TO BE DEPOSED SHALL NOT NOW BE REVEALED AT THE PERSON TESTIMONY IN NEED TO BE PERPETUATED IS ONLY MY SON MR. DENARIO MALIK HOOKS,785 TYRONE DRIVE,PRENTISS,MISSISSIPPI 39474 WHO MUST NEED BE BY SUBPOENA COMPELLED TO ATTEND SUCH PRELIMINARY-PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEARING.**""**

DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT TO DECLARE RIGHTS THAT ARE UNCLEAR OR CERTAIN
That declaratory judgement consistent with FRCP RULE 57 to declare:
1. That Hecks do not bar the NOVEMBER 2014 WARRANTLESS SEIZURE RESULTING IN 75 DAYS IMPRISONMENT AND PETITIONER has agreed to settle such matter herein for $2500.00 per day for the 75 days proximately caused by the Municipal OR THAT A SUIT MAY COMMENCE IN THAT NOVEMBER 2014 MATTER IN STATE OR FEDERAL COURT;
2. That the docket,motions,and papers filed or taken in The Municipal Of PRENTISS to arrive at conviction and sentence will proceed in State Court, 15th Judicial District and the Circuit Clerk shall refrain from the process of outright denial of indigency application As the Circuit Clerk of Jefferson Davis County OR WITHIN TEN DAY OR AS ORDERED BY THIS COURT SHALL FILE ITS INDIGENCY PROCESS OR INTAKE TO RECIEVE AND DOCKET FILES AS SET OUT AT FACT PARA 3-6(A) ABOVE.
3. That HECKS do or don't bar a suit against the Municipal Of PRENTISS for false arrest or imprisonment and
4. Declare how this Court shall Contro this matter on its dockets specifically if Appeal of the matter will occur in Federal Court as Docketed, whether appeal is NECCESARY in light of misconstrued or undisputable factual allegations taken as true by this Court Or otherwise;
5. Declare the Court an rule without bias of the false April 4, 2008 actions of the PETITIONER in open court.
6. Declare Email SENTENCING as occur upon the PETITIONER is unlawfully derived to the effect of 36 months taken in Accord with Just Compensation or otherwise Involuntary Servitude is hereby abolished and the practice thereof "COMMISIONER,sentencing judge, and other officials" secret email sentence extensions is DULY FELONY FALSE IMPRISONMENT further declaring:
PETIONER must be recreated 36 months and compensated therefore and how such payment shall be made not to interfere with Petitioner SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME.

B. That in Accord with FRCP RULE 17 PETITIONER DURING APPEAL TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND PRIOR TO BRINGING A SUIT FOR "TWO NOVEMBERS AGAINST THE MUNICIPAL Furtherance 42 USCS SECT 1985(1)(2)(3) CONSPIRATOL DEPRIVIATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS BY A SINGLE EMAIL-MEMO-ASSUALTIVE FORCED PSYCHIATRIC MEDICATION SCHEME WITH NUMBEROUS ACTS OF SOVERNITY CLASS BASED ANIMUS SOLEY UPON "ABILITY BY THE STATE TO DOCUMENT FALSE PSYCHIATRIC NEEDS" THAT AMOUNTED TO A SINGLE POLICY ACT POSSIBLY INVOLVED BY OVER 100 DEFENDANTS SOME WHO MAY BE FACING IMPEACHMENT, OR OTHERWISE ABLE TO MONITOR AND TRACK PETITIONER INTENT TO CAUSE LIFE THREATNING DANGERS OR PROVACATION AND ACTS OF THE MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE TO 'THROUGHOUT PETITION OF GOVERNMENT FROM SUCH INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE DID FILE NUMBEROUS MOCKS OF PETITIONER'S DISTRESS KNOWING SUCH 36 MONTHS WAS UNLAWFULLY ONGIONG OR CLEARLRY DISCERNABLE UNLAWFUL SAAG'S FAILURE TO ACT TO CEASE SUCH EMAIL SCHEME THEREBY FOR THE ENTIRE 36 MONTHS DID COMPLETELY SHAM PETITIONER OUT OF 36 MONTHS LIFE, LIBERTY,PROPERTY,FAMILY,BUSINESS,CHURCH, AND OTHER INTERESTS, NUMBEROUS PERSON ARE SOUGHT FOR DEPOSITION.
That PETITIONER but for his need for personal security, family security and other life interests will not PETITION TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY OF POSSIBLE CRIMINAL PROSECUTUONS OF THE US MAKE HIS CLAIM HERE BUT RESERVE SUCH THAT I THE PETITION IN NO WISE INTERFERE WITH THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF DEFENDANT EX-COMMMISSIONER CHRISTOPER B. EPPS.

C. That the PETITIONER finally prays that any and all disrespectful languages in filing be stricken form the record and LASTLY THE SAID FEDERAL PROSECUTOR OR PROBATION OFFICERS OR DISTRICT COURT HENRY T. WINGATE WOULD RESOLVE THE 36 EMAIL SENTENCING SCHEME, AND RENDER JUST AND DUE COMPENSATION FOR THOSE 36 MONTHS SUFFERED, AS THAT AND THE TWO NOVEMBER CLAIMS WILL DISSOLVE ANY INTENT OR DESIRE OF SUCH POLITICAL AND POWERFUL OFFICIALS FROM MONITORING OR OTHERWISE TRACKING THE PETITIONER, WHO IS SORELY GRIEVED AS THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY HAS BEEN UNLAWFULLY CLOSED SOLEY BASED ON INDIGENCY IN VIOLATION OF USCA 14 EQUAL PROTECTIONS OF LAWS THAT BALANCE RIGHTS OF THE RICH AND POOR IN EQUALITY, AND DEMANDS FOR JUSTICE.
As such the January 22, 2016 Organization account was not for interference with any Federal or otherwise ongoing prosection or investigation, but upon sincere desire to continue Organization original SS-4 application as requestedrequestedand, but infused with EDUCATIONAL MUSIC GAINED FROM AN ILLEGAL TERM OF IMPRISIONMENT. During a 36 month excessively extended and prolonged prison term directed by Christoper B. Epp a revised plan and start up during 2014 was documented and designed upon INCORP50222 and stored in the United States Small Business Adminstration, due to mistrust from the official misuse of authority as a Commissioner of Corrections and for safety preservation of business planning and also prevention of theft by state officials.

CORPORATE INDIVIDIOUS GENDER INEQUALITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM ONE
A. DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS as revised in 2014 as "INCORP50222" IS AN EXCLUSIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF EDUCATIONAL VICES AND CHARITY BASED ON PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR'S CHURCH UPBRINGING,MODERNIZATION AND NOW INCLUDES A PRISON EXPERIENCE










WHICH IF UNLAWFULLY HINDERED FROM OPERATING AS AN ORGANIZATION WTHCOMMUNITY,INDIVIDUALS, OR CHURCHES TRUST IN 2012 IF FOUND AT CURRENT OR FUTURE REGIONS BANK INVESTIGATION OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSURE OF ANY INVESTIGATION RESULTS AFTER CRIMINAL OR CIVIL JURY, PLEAS, OR COURT DECLARATIONS WOULD THEN DEMAND COMPENSATION OF $265,,000.00 of each current or former officers,directors,employees,agents,representatives,contractors,subcontractors,parent, subsidiaries,affiliates,successors,assigns,any third party that assigned by and through Regions Banking and thereby directly or indirectly:
funded the annexed hereto authentic proof of criminal felony false imprisonment "the June 7, 2012 withdrawal of 36 months by an email and memo scheme,plan, or agreement in violation of 42 USCS SECTION 1985(1) TO DEPRIVE ORGANIZATION PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR OF SANITY,TRUST OR POSITIONS IN THE ORGANIZATION, AND\OR CIVIL RIGHTS AVAILABLE IF JUNE 7,2012 DISCHARGE HAD OCCURRED, WHERE SUCH ORGANIZATION WAS INCORPORATED IN 2007 AND REMAINED IN GOOD STANDING WITH THE MISSISSIPPI SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE TIME OF THE JANUARY 22,2016 TRANSACTION INVOLVING COMMERENCE, WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD NOT LIMIT ORGANIZATION TO MUSIC ONLY.
EXHIBIT ONE is an June 2, 2012 7:02 A.M. email directing holding up on processing Organization Principal Incorporator out of prison as expected on June 7, 2012.















EXHIBIT TWO is an June 5, 2012 memo that resulted from the email removing 36 months.















EXHIBIT THREE is the sole, first and only authorised transaction involving commerce or monetary banking and but for unconscionability of legality of "organizational rights to sue apart from individuality was not in accord with legal actions,written planning and filed charters or mission statement,and while minimum standards was met to open and maintain the account, as dated January 22, 2016 .











EXHIBIT FOUR upon information and beliefs is the close out of the Organization account dated June 15, 2016---------------------------------------------------------------













Facts In Support of Claim One
1. That there are two other original incorporators JERVIS MARTIN AND KIMBERLY LUTER both of whom since original signature upon Article of Incorporation has not obtained permission or authorization to use Organization in any contrary manner outside Visions of FOUNDER,or Principal Incorporator and any transactions of COMMERENCE hence a.) Original Application for Employer's Identification Number alone by Principal Incorporator and b.) 36 month excessive prolongment and confinement by "other officials" indicated at the email or otherwise is FRUAD.

2. That in Violation of The United States Constitution Amendment 14 Prohibition of Gender Inequality the name "Coach KIM-CROSBY" infers a "LGBT" friendly Organization and further investigations may find a.) The course of forced medication endured during 2008-2015 was PUNITIVE Retailiation and VIOLATIVE of 42 USCS SECTION 1985(1) WITH INTENT TO DEPRIVE PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR Trust and Position in His own companyand b.) Evidences Establishment of State Religion against the Organization and constitutes discrimination through official misuse of State Commissioner of Correction power to accomplish 36 months prison prolongment and business disruption.
3. That at the signing of the Article of Incorporation the person's JERVIS MARTIN AND KIMBERLY LUTER had no revealed or fully drawn or written or express permission to sale,build,affiliate,barter, and\or do business with EIN 32-0199974.
4. That on JUNE 2, 2016 negotiation with Original Incorporator JERVIS MARTIN to make 33 Jordan Hill Road, Carson,Mississippi 39427-6325 resulted in a safety risk to Organization Principal Incorporator to live and further the Organization interests,abilities, and yet serve Lineage of Martin children of Mr. Ottie Mae Martin and Mrs. Rachael Mae Martin, wherein no water, refridgerator, air conditioning, or Internet existed at Heirs property of an old cottage or mobile home, PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR with funds of Supplemental Security Income or back time pay did undertake to:
A. Purchase the Water Services in advance of Lily Rose to install a water meter and water line start at approximately $455.00.
B. Purchase a refridgerator for costs of $250.00.
C. Purchase an Air Conditioner Unit for cooling at $100.00.
D. Purchase a Dish Digital Home Advantage Plan Aggrement which was installed.
5. The vulgarity,threats,mental illnesses,and\or plan to obtain property without intent to accomplish any Organizational planning or designment, but strictly to there after steal any property;. By and through over-intrusive oral and wire interception; upon information and belief designed and\ or operated by ELLA MAE JOHNSON with reckless disregard for Organization Principal Incorporator health,safety,life,liberty,and property interests while undergoing negotiations with JERVIS MARTIN; As Heir Through Shirley Mae Jones ,my birthright mother to "right to reside,build, and\or conduct Organizational affairs " on such heirs property during June 2016 without compromise, spying, or intent to defruad as unconscionability and lack of knowlede existed that "Aunt Ella Mae Johnson was running a live relay microphone like spy entrapment and probable theft,or hinderance schemes at at time when a federal investigations of involved parties and actors within a $1 Billion-dollar Correctional scandal and ONGOING PROSECUTION-LITIGATION BY PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR AS HIS OWN LAWYER IN THE SAME CORRECTIONAL SCHEME -WHICH SPY TECH MAY HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE AND USED AGAINST OR TESTED UPON PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR AS EARLY AS 2013, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 2013; AND ALSO DURING NOVEMBER 2014 VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND RETURN TO MDOC ON SAID EXCESSIVE AND PROLONGED 36 MONTH EMAIL SCHEME FOR FURTHERANCE OF THE EMAIL SCHEME OR INTENT TO CONCEAL INVOLVEMENT AS AN OTHER OFFICIAL AND THEREBY PLACE THE PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR IN CONTINUAL PHYSICAL ENCOUTERS WITH JERVIS MARTIN, FOR UNLAWFUL PROVOCATIONAL REVERSE ATTACKS BY JERVIS MARTIN AND TO DEPRIVE PRINCIPAL INCORPORATOR OF INVESTMENTS IN 2016 AND ACCESS TO USE OF INVESTMENTS AT SAID, 33 JORDAN HILL ROAD, CARSON,MISSISSIPPI 39427-6325.
6. As a result of paragraphs 1-5 upon information and belief fruadulent acts of trade and commerce unlawfully through my ORGANIZATION may be ongoing without my expressed or granted consent,as part of acts of "other officials" at said JUNE 2, 2012 EMAIL, SEE EXHIBIT ONE.
7. That during paragraph 1-6 above JERVIS MARTIN merely paid back his half of the water works at $225.00 but by strong arm threats and aggressive provocational acts upon information and belief radio assited with spy technology at all times known to JERVIS MARTIN, unconscious however to Principal Incorporator, JERVIS Martin was performing acts of intended credible harm, aggression, anger, and threats daily at all encounters but for "kicks" and business intellectual theft or to set up other provocational harm.
8.That Principal Incorporator has never been allowed to any half use of water works initially an fully funded by SSI disbursements, and believes JERVIS MARTIN OR ELLA MAE JOHNSON OWES $230.00 FOR SUCH WATER INSTALLMENT, AND REASONABLE INTERESTS.
9. That principal Incorporator did recover Air Conditioning Unit but loss $70.00 interests therein the ordeal.
10. That principal Incorporator never retained property of $250.00 refridgerator and JERVIS MARTIN retains and at no cost have used such without any intent to reimburse PROPERTY or $250.00 cost of refridgerator, WHEREFORE IN ACCORD WITH FEDERAL OR STATE CIVIL PROCEEDURES ,THE PROPOSED IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF DETECTION OF FRUAD SHALL BEGIN;
FRCP RULE 27 MOTION FOR COURT ORDERED DEPOSITIONS PENDING APPPEAL ANDPRIOR TO BRINGING AN ORIGINAL ACTION Comes Now, PETITIONER;ERIC DEJUAN JONES AKA ERIC CROSBY aggrieved at a factual and legally questionable:
1. Issuance of an Email by former MISSISSIPPI Department of Correction Commissioner Defendant Christopher B. Epps directing Defendant E.L. Sparkman to " hold up processing the petitioner former prisoner to Earned Release Supervision" resulting in:













A. Defendant E.L. composing a MEMO on June 5, 2012 returned as directed discriminatorily requesting 36 MONTHS from the Petitioner's MDOC TIME COMPUTATION SHEET,
C. As a result of the E-MAIL AND MEMO SCHEME A COLLISION COURSE RESULTED IN BOTH HABEAS CORPUS ACTIONS AND CONSPIRACIES TO :
1. Get an Court order to null and void the MDOC JUNE 7, 2012 ACTIONS RESULTING IN SALE OF SUCH PRISON MONTHS AND
2. Remedy and Enjoin immenint threats of assualts by use of antipsychotic Drugs without informed consent, assualts by other inmates and forced medication by EMCF psychiatry staff and for compensation.

Wherefore Depositions to Perpetuate Testimony Before an Action Is Filed In the Veteran's Claims Court, United States Claims Court and\or 42 USCS SECT(S)1983 AND 1985(1)(2) and (3)Action to Prosecute 36 months Reparations Email Sentence Scheme and The Handling Thereof Despite Clearly Established Slavery Phohibitions during and admist the current USDOJ probe into the handling of the Clinton Email matter.

COMES NOW PETITIONER, ERIC DEJUAN JONES D.B.A. "PMINK" who wants to perpetuate testimony of

1.Affiant Unknown Naidow, employed as EMCF ARP AND OTHERWSE "PRLA" expected adverse defendant in a perjury, fraud and\or theft-- of EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 ORIGINAL AS SUBMITTED FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF PETITIONERS WRITTEN OR OTHERWISE PERSERVED AS SUBMITTED ARP OF PETITIONER WHICH PROMPTED RECIEPTED EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 AS DISCLOSED IN "a collision coursed" 36 MONTH habeas corpus orgin in Lauderdale Circuit Court and Conspiracy to Violate Petitioner's Substantive Right of Informed Consent---"at a time when trial upon 9 defendants had been set in The United States District Court before Carton W. Reeves on November 13, 2014 or thereabout."

Defendant Management Training Corporation is represented by Steven J. Griffin who filed motion to dismiss for failure to fully exhaust and did submit the motion for dismissal with said affiant Mrs. Unknown Naidow but evaded somehow during discovery to disclosed written EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 AS OTHERWISE SUBMITTED BY PETITIONER OR PERSERVED UPON CLEARLY ESTABLISHED MDOC SOP AND STATE LAWS REQUIRING:

1. Three (3) year retention of all submitted MDOC PRISONERS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY PROGRAM SUBMISSIONS FOR DELIVERY TO COURTS IN EVEN OF A LATER LAWSUIT yet those substance and form as submitted by the petitioner was never "found or PERSERVED by MDOC " of similarly situated state prisoners for three years and mysteriously not available.
As such the lawsuit is presently at NO. 15-60266 in the United States Court of Appeals for failure to exhaust upon the District Court nor Magistrate having not reviewed those

"as submitted by PETITIONER EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 complaints which derived RECIEPTED completion of EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84"

resulting in Court defrauding,theft, or perjury AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS,THREE (3) YEAR PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT OR AVAILABILTY OF --PETITIONERS WRITTEN ARPS WHICH CAUSED THE RECIEPTED who now has need to now Perpetuate Testimony of said Mrs. Unknown Naidow and Attorney Steven J. Griffen upon following DEPOSITIONS as stipulated:

WRTTEN DEPOSITIONS TO MRS. UNKNOWN NAIDOW, EMCF ARPS DIRECTOR

1. Mrs. NAIDOW WHERE YOU EMPLOYED AT THE TIME EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 WAS FILED IN EMCF ARP DOCKETS?
2. Mrs. NAIDOW where did you learn to docket EMCF ARPS ?
3. Mrs. NAIDOW who trained you as how long STATE OF MISSISSIPPI EMCF ARP ARE TO BE MAINTAINED AND HOW DO YOU MAINTAIN THEM AT CURRENT?
3. Mrs. NAIDOW when did you discover EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 RECEIPTS AND ORIGINAL SUBMISSIONS WHERE NOT AT EMCF ARP DOCKETS?
4. Mrs. NAIDOW considering your security clearance, monitoring, and time alone in EMCF ARP OFFICE explain to this deponent how easy it would be IF DIRECTED BY SUPERIORS OF EMCF OR MDOC "to destroy and fully remove an inmate Written or otherwise submitted ARP?
5. Mrs. Naidow is your husband now or at any time been your superior or director or trianer while or since employment at EMCF?
6. Mrs NAIDOW did you in any allow, participate, or remove EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 directly or indirectly, through personal actions or security ladles or otherwise to STOP THIS COURT ACTION FROM PROCEEDING TO JURY TRIAL?
7. At the time of affidavit by MTC ATTORNEY EXPLAIN HOW YOU WERE SOLICITATED AND THE ENTIRE PROCEES BY WHICH MTC ATTORNEY SOLICITATED OR MADE INITIAL CONTACT WITH YOU?
8. Mrs. NAIDOW did you know the your affidavit truth and veracity would stop a jury trial if " no substance of written EMCF 45 AND EMCF 84 was disclosed to this Court?
END OF MRS. NAIDOW DEPOSITIONS.

Thus while at this time of filing the status of the collateral Habeas Corpus is Unknown and at its Lauderdale Circuit Court orgin has been defended by SAAG FOR OFFICE OF MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO-WIT:
Attorneys James Jim Norris, Jerrolyn Ownens, Francis Croft, and Leslie Miller at new action shall be adverse parties or defendant as the petitioner will allegde these SPECIAL ASSISTIANT ATTORNEY GENERALS knew and did assist in a "doomed to fail forced psychiatry email sentencing scheme through suppression,misconduct during investigation of court actions , and failure to disclose such Readily available email and memo for in court inspection and at minimum halting the continuation of the Slavery term before or on February 13, 2013 instead took the role of ignorant at state laws MISS ANN CODE 47-5-99 TO 104, Urguing the Courts PETITIONER had no right to prohibit 36 months removal, as such using powers of The MISSISSIPPI Office of Attorney General to Approve a single policy action upon only the petitioner contrary to MDOC SOP 18-01-01 AND OTHER STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS PROXIMATLY CAUSING LACK OF AFIRMATIVE EQUAL APPLICATION OF APPLICABLE MDOC SOP AND CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAWS PREVENTING INCREASE OF FINALIZED RULE VIOLATION REPORTS, THAT SUCH WOULD AND DID FURTHER THE UNLAWFUL SLAVERY BY EMAIL SCHEME BY DIRECTLY SUPPRESSING A THE EMAIL AND MEMO AND OR PRESENTING SHAMLIKE AND MOCKING ANSWERS AND OTHER FILING being thereby under the flexible plausibility standard requiring petitioner to amplify this new action with specific facts thereof, but being unknown at commencement of those habeas and conspiracy complaints necessary facts now discovered pending appeal to the effects of furthering and actually causing continuation and completion of the :
1. 36 months excesive extension on the PETITIONER inmate time sheet
2. And prolongment of state official misuse of state powers until February 13, 2015
3. Wherein this new action the evidence of the time prolongment contrary to state law MISS ANN CODE 47-5-99 TO -104 and clearly established Slavery prohibitions of the USCA 13, USCA 8 and USCA 14

AS IF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE ITSELF DIRECTED THE A SCHEME TO EXTEND PETITION INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT JUNE 7, 2012 UNTIL DECEMBER 13, 2013 VIOLATIVE OF VITEK V. JONES PROCEEDURES THROUGH A EMAIL AND MEMO SCHEME "DIRECTED" AS REQUIRED OF Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that top government officials were not liable for the actions of their subordinates absent evidence that they ordered the allegedly discriminatory activity.

The question now arises whether The State Attorney General SAAG(S) handling of the EMAIL AND MEMO through personal involvement in a now found to be true Email Sentencing and Psychiatric Assualts during MDOC sale of 36 months at $12,000.00 per month constitutes the States approval of EMAIL SENTENCING to include Double Jeopardy USCA 5 IMPRISONMENT FOR PRIOR ACQUITAL IN A 1999 MURDER TRIAL OR OTHER CLASS BASED ANIMUS OF OFFICIALS AT A 2007 BLOG RECENTLY DISCOVERED BY THE PETITIONER TO BE PUBLISHED ON INTERNET GOOGLE OF: ERIC D. JONES AKA ERIC CROSBY WIDELY VISIBLE TO PUBLIC SINCE SAID 2007 AND DIRECTLY CAUSES THE SECURITY ALERTS TO PETITIONER PUBLIC SAFETY AND PRISON SAFETY WHICH MDOC OFFICIALS WOULD HAVE BEEN MANDATEC TO AT ALL TIMES PROVIDE SINGLE MAN HOUSING AND CERTIFIED PROTECTIVE CUSTODY DUE TO MALICE LIKE CALL FOR STREET JUSTICE OR VIOLENCE WITHOUT A CHANCE OF FAIR JURY TRIAL AND CONVICTION.
Each of those bloggers indenity is patently unknown to the Petition and may be the " other officials " indicated in the June 2, 2012 7:02 p.m. email believed to have been composed of directed at Parchman prison during a actual execution of an unknown MDOC prisoner.
Had not such Email issued, no memo would have issued and the petitioner would not have been held up on processing out on ERS until December 13, 2013 or in violation of Washington v. Harper, forced medicated on July 12, 2012.
Such forced medication would therefore be Furtherance of the Email Scheme under a "doomed to fail " mental illness shocking cover up of the petitioners mental capacity, credibility, and truthfulness wherein safety required to remain alive and state and plead a cause of action was inhibited by the forced medication effects and control of MDOC Authorities to retailiate,harass,and cause security lapses or accidents to the petitoner.
Whence service by summons was completed and MDOC in response administered an April 24, 2013 forced medicating of petitioner almost resulting in death. Whereafter and during continuation of the Email Scheme a Spears hearing before Magistrate Linda R. Anderderson in Jackson, Mississippi Federal court occured where SAAG Attorney for MDOC disclosed....It was that day at minimum or upon the discovery of the Email subject DEFENDANT CHRISTOPER B. EPPS DID NOT FIRST RECIEVE A MEMO FROM DEFENDANT SPARKMAN BUT DEFENDANT EPPS ACTUALLY FIRST DIRECTED DEFENDANT SPARKMAN CONSISTENT WITH Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), to specifically "hold up on processing Petitioner out on the previously May 22, 2012 ERS discharge reciept and THEREAFTER AS DIRECTED DEFENDANT SPARKMAN DID COMPOSE A MEMO FOR 36 MONTHS REMOVAL RESULTING IN "HOLDING UP ON PROCESSING PETITIONER ON JUNE 7, 2012 UNTIL DECEMBER 13, 2013 AND WITH ALSO AN EXTRA 18 MONTHS ON ERS EXTENDING MDOC JURISDICTION AND CONTROL OF THE PETITION AND EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF HIS MENTAL AND PHYSICAL BODY UNLAWFULLY. Wherein even upon Involuntary Commitment precluded by VITEK V. JONES clearly establishes a minimum process which the STATE SINGLE E-MAIL AND MEMO ACTS fail to comply and is shocking and absurdinly derived though possible "sale for $12,000.00 per month and without any state immunities for such vicarious conduct at this single Email and Memo Scheme of 36 months of slavery which petitioner claims $36 million in compensation and liability to the State Treasury exists as:

A. State final policy making authority was used to initiate and continue 36 months excessive prolongment of involuntary commitment and servitude VIOLATIVE of USCA EIGHT, THIRTEEN AND BOTH PROCEEDURES AND THE SUBSTANATIVE CLAUSES OF USCA FOURTEEN.

B. Email sentencing has never been caught in America and the handling thereof after state and federal discovery evidence the 2007 blog, 2008 court revocation, and or prior ACQUITAL in 1999 and 2002 render class-animus based reckless disregard of the email and memo and its effects WHEREBY MDOC CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OF PHYCHIATRIC COURSES IN PUNITIVE ASSUALTIVE IN CONTRAST TO INFORMED CONSENTUAL PSYCHIATRIC DESIRES BEST INTERESTS OF THE PETITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN TRUSTED TO CARE UNIT OUTSIDE PRISON PAYMENTS FOR SERVICE OR ULTIMATE AUTHORITY.

C. As such liability should rest upon state of Mississippi NOT THE USA SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION for DEVASTATING STATE DEPRIVIATION OF NUMBEROUS FUTURE(AFTER INCARCERATION) LIFE AND LIBERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS SUCH ACTIONS AND FACTS DEPRIVED AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEPRIVE AND DECOMPOSE DUE TO SOCIAL STIGMA AND ENGENDERING CONSQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT AND FORCED MEDICATIONS AND RESULTING "UNLAWFUL BRIAN CHEMICAL ALTERATIONS AND PROGRAMMING" OR INTERDISCIPLINARY via a lawsuit after a jury trial and immediate action to perpetuate Testimony as set out in this verified petition prior to bring a new action about this quasi-habeas and conspiracy matter cognizable in the Veterans Court of Appeals( VA claim pending), United States Court( against the United States and/or it 2008 to January 20, 2017 executive administrator(s) of two or three FCTA certified notices or United States Attorney Harold Britian), Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court or Americans with Disabilities Act Division of USDOJ(FAIR HOUSING/ADA CLAIMS), OR THIS the United States District Court Of Mississippi where now Petitioner files this his verified petition in the district court for the district where main Defendant and key expected adverse party resides in this Jackson Division as does the State government does daily affairs in the County of Hinds, City of Jackson, State of Mississippi.

A.JURISDICTION
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER VETERAN AFFAIRS CLAIMS SUBMITTED TO :
1. Upgrade or downgrade Mililtary discharge made from and through EMCF ILAP( "INMATE LEGAL ASSISTANCAE PROGRAM DURING 2008 TO 2015 OR
2. Or the current Mississippi Decision Review Officer consolidation of SSA AND VA OR NRECONSIDERATION
Some of the testimony sought will be used to perpetuate Testimony of psychiatric interdisciplinary during a claimed UNLAWFUL INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT AND FORCED BRAIN CHEMICAL ALTERATIONS;

At this injunction and stage the petition SPECIFICALLY motions for an order authorizing the petitioner to depose the named persons in order to perpetuate their testimony I.e.,
Each of nine defendants at FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 15-60266 AS IDENTIFIABLE AT DOCKET IN THE DISTRICT COURT OR BY NOTICE TO ATTRONEYS:
1. Tommy D.Goodwin for MDOC Defendants
2.Steven J. Griffin for MTC Defendants
3. Robert H. Peterson for Nurse Evelyn Dunn.

Wherefore petitioner Eric DeJuan Jones show the United States District Court TO-WIT upon oath:

That I am the petitioner in this matter and multiple actions of Appeals and other civil rights complaints over the Handling of MY 2003 SENTENCE AND MY PROERTY SEIZED AT ARREST IN THE POLITICAL SUBDIVION LAWRENCE COUNTY MISSISSIPPI WHICH FINALLY ON MARCH 15,2015 THE COURT WITHOUT RRFERRENCE TO HIS THE SENTENCING JUDGE PRENTISS G. HARRELL PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WITH A JUNE 2, 2012 AT 7:02 P.M. EMAIL DIRECTIVE RULED IN A FORFEITURE Matter which til this date of petition to perpetuate Testimony has not been appealed to THE HIGHEST COURT OF MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS DUE TO SYSTEMATIC DENIAL, SALE OR DELAY OF IMMEDIATE INFORMA PAUPERIS DOCKETING,AND PROMPT COURT CONSIDERATION,
That in a likewise 2008 probation revocation before Judge PRENTISS G. HARRELL factual malicious publication that petitioner put a hole in the wall is untrue and patently falsehood designed to put a jacket of dangerousness which was so severe that Court ruled on FRIDAY MDOC TOOK CUSTODY OF MY BODY MONDAY AND BY WEDNESDAY IS NAKED IN A 24-HOUR SUCICIDE CELL AND GOWN.
That a PUNITIVE course of forced medications without informed consent or right to refuse did continue more than 5 but less than over 20 occasions at various degrees of custody security and access to other state prisoners.
That such PUNITIVE course of forced medications did continue at CMCF and did operate to VIOLATE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED case law dicta:

Held: The judgment is affirmed as modified. Pp. 445 U. S. 486-497; 445 U. S. 497-500.

Affirmed as modified.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV-A, and V, concluding that:

1. The District Court properly found that the case is not moot. The reality of the controversy between appellee and the State has not been lessened by the cancellation of his parole and his return to prison, where he is protected from further transfer by the District Court's judgment

Page 445 U. S. 481

and injunction. Under these circumstances, it is not "absolutely clear," absent the injunction, that the State's alleged wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Pp. 445 U. S. 486-487.

2. The involuntary transfer of appellee to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 445 U. S. 487-494.

(a) The District Court properly identified a liberty interest rooted in § 83-180(1), under which a prisoner could reasonably expect that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital without a finding that he was suffering from a mental illness for which he could not secure adequate treatment in prison. The State's reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist for determining whether the conditions warranting transfer exist neither removes the prisoner's interest from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution. Pp. 445 U. S. 488-491.

(b) The District Court was also correct in holding that, independently of § 83-180(1), the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections. Involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual. While a conviction and sentence extinguish an individual's right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, they do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections. Here, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections. Pp. 491-494.

3. The District Court properly identified and weighed the relevant factors in arriving at its judgment. Pp. 445 U. S. 495-496.

(a) Although the State's interest in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong, the prisoner's interest in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome treatment is also powerful, and the risk of error in making the determinations required by § 83-180(1) is substantial enough to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error. P. 445 U. S. 495.

(b) The medical nature of the inquiry as to whether or not to transfer a prisoner to a mental hospital does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. P. 445 U. S. 495.

Page 445 U. S. 482

(c) Because prisoners facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital are threatened with immediate deprivation of liberty interests, and because of the risk of mistaken transfer, the District Court properly determined that certain procedural protections, including notice and an adversary hearing, were appropriate in the circumstances present in this case. Pp. 445 U. S. 495-496.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, joined by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded in Part IV-B that it is appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill. Such a prisoner has an even greater need for legal assistance than does a prisoner who is illiterate and uneducated, because he is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. Pp. 445 U. S. 496-497.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL concluded that, although the State is free to appoint a licensed attorney to represent a prisoner who is threatened with involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, it is not constitutionally required to do so, and that due process will be satisfied so long as such a prisoner is provided qualified and independent assistance. Pp. 445 U. S. 497-500.

WHITE, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV-A, and V, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 445 U. S. 497. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 445 U. S. 500. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 445 U. S. 501.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B.

The question in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a prisoner convicted and incarcerated in the State of Nebraska to certain procedural

Page 445 U. S. 483

protections, including notice, an adversary hearing, and provision of counsel, before he is transferred involuntarily to a state mental hospital for treatment of a mental disease or defect.

I

Nebraska Rev.Stat. § 8176(2) (1976) authorizes the Director of Correctional Services to designate any available, suitable, and appropriate residence facility or institution as a place of confinement for any state prisoner and to transfer a prisoner from one place of confinement to another. Section 8180(1), however, provides that, when a designated physician or psychologist finds that a prisoner "suffers from a mental disease or defect" and "cannot be given proper treatment in that facility," the director may transfer him for examination, study, and treatment to another institution within or without the Department of Correctional Services. [Footnote 1] Any prisoner so transferred to a mental hospital is to be returned to the Department if, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment is no longer necessary. Upon expiration of sentence,

Page 445 U. S. 484

if the State desires to retain the prisoner in a mental hospital, civil commitment proceedings must be promptly commenced. § 83-180(3). [Footnote 2]

On May 31, 1974, Jones was convicted of robbery and sentenced to a term of three to nine years in state prison. He was transferred to the penitentiary hospital in January, 1975. Two days later, he was placed in solitary confinement, where he set his mattress on fire, burning himself severely. He was treated in the burn unit of a private hospital. Upon his release and based on findings required by § 83-180 that he was suffering from a mental illness or defect and could not receive proper treatment in the penal complex, he was transferred to the security unit of the Lincoln Regional Center, a state mental hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Institutions.

Jones then intervened in this case, which was brought by other prisoners against the appropriate state officials (the State) challenging on procedural due process grounds the adequacy of the procedures by which the Nebraska statutes permit transfers from the prison complex to a mental hospital. [Footnote 3] On August 17, 1976, a three-judge District Court, convened

Page 445 U. S. 485

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), [Footnote 4] denied the State's motion for summary judgment, and trial ensued. On September 12, 1977, the District Court declared § 83-180 unconstitutional as applied to Jones, holding that transferring Jones to a mental hospital without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing deprived him of liberty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and that such transfers must be accompanied by adequate notice, an adversary hearing before an independent decisionmaker, a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision, and the availability of appointed counsel for indigent prisoners. Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.Supp. 569 (Neb.1977). Counsel was requested to suggest appropriate relief.

In response to this request, Jones revealed that, on May 27, 1977, prior to the District Court's decision, he had been transferred from Lincoln Regional Center to the psychiatric ward of the penal complex, but prayed for an injunction against further transfer to Lincoln Regional Center. The State conceded that an injunction should enter if the District Court was firm in its belief that the section was unconstitutional. The District Court then entered its judgment declaring § 83-180 unconstitutional as applied to Jones and permanently enjoining the State from transferring Jones to Lincoln Regional Center without following the procedures prescribed in its judgment.

We noted probable jurisdiction 434 U.S. 1060 (1978). Meanwhile, Jones had been paroled, but only on condition that he accept psychiatric treatment at a Veterans' Administration Hospital. We vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case to that court for consideration

Page 445 U. S. 486

of the question of mootness. Vitek v. Jones, 436 U. S. 407 (1978). Both the State and Jones, at this juncture, insisted that the case was not moot. The State represented that, because "Jones' history of mental illness indicates a serious threat to his own safety, as well as to that of others . . . there is a very real expectation" that he would again be transferred if the injunction was removed. App. to Juris.Statement 24. Jones insisted that he was receiving treatment for mental illness against his will, and that he was continuing to suffer from the stigmatizing consequences of the previous determination that he was mentally ill. On these representations, the District Court found that the case was not moot, because Jones "is subject to and is in fact under threat of being transferred to the state mental hospital under § 83-180." Ibid. The District Court reinstated its original judgment. We postponed consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 441 U.S. 922 (1979). Meanwhile, Jones had violated his parole, his parole had been revoked, and he had been reincarcerated in the penal complex.

II

We agree with the parties in this case that a live controversy exists and that the case is not moot. Jones was declared to be mentally ill pursuant to § 8180, and was transferred to a mental hospital and treated. He was later paroled, but only on condition that he accept mental treatment. He violated that parole, and has been returned to the penal complex. On our remand to consider mootness, the District Court, relying on Jones' history of mental illness and the State's representation that he represented a serious threat to his own safety as well as to that of others, found that Jones "is in fact under threat of being transferred to the state mental hospital under § 8180." We see no reason to disagree with the District Court's assessment at that time, and the reality of the controversy between Jones and the State has not been lessened by the cancellation of his parole and his return to the state prison,

Page 445 U. S. 487

where he is protected from further transfer by the outstanding judgment and injunction of the District Court. The State, believing that the case is not moot, wants the injunction removed by the reversal of the District Court's judgment. Jones, on the other hand, insists that the judgment of the District Court be sustained and the protection against transfer to a mental hospital, except in accordance with the specified procedures, be retained.

Against this background, it is not "absolutely clear," absent the injunction, "that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 393 U. S. 203 (1968); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 440 U. S. 631 (1979); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 345 U. S. 633 (1953). [Footnote 5] Furthermore, as the matter now stands, the § 83-180 determination that Jones suffered from mental illness has been declared infirm by the District Court. Vacating the District Court's judgment as moot would not only vacate the injunction against transfer, but also the declaration that the procedures employed by the State afforded an inadequate basis for declaring Jones to be mentally ill. In the posture of the case, it is not moot.

III

On the merits, the threshold question in this case is whether the involuntary transfer of a Nebraska state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. The District Court held that it did, and offered two related reasons for its conclusion. The District Court first identified a liberty interest rooted in

Page 445 U. S. 488

§ 83-180(1), under which a prisoner could reasonably expect that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital without a finding that he was suffering from a mental illness for which he could not secure adequate treatment in the correctional facility. Second, the District Court was convinced that characterizing Jones as a mentally ill patient and transferring him to the Lincoln Regional Center had "some stigmatizing" consequences which, together with the mandatory behavior modification treatment to which Jones would be subject at the Lincoln Center, constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a "grievous loss" that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing. We agree with the District Court in both respects.

A

We have repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no "constitutional or inherent right" to parole, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 442 U. S. 7 (1979), but once a State grants a prisoner the conditional liberty properly dependent on the observance of special parole restrictions, due process protections attach to the decision to revoke parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The same is true of the revocation of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), we held that a state-created right to good-time credits, which could be forfeited only for serious misbehavior, constituted a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. We also noted that the same reasoning could justify extension of due process protections to a decision to impose "solitary" confinement, because

"[it] represents a major change in the conditions of confinement, and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct."

Id. at 418 U. S. 571-572, n.19. Once a State has

Page 445 U. S. 489

granted prisoners a liberty interest, we held that due process protections are necessary "to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Id. at 418 U. S. 557.

In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976), we held that the transfer of a prisoner from one prison to another does not infringe a protected liberty interest. But in those cases, transfers were discretionary with the prison authorities, and in neither case did the prisoner possess any right or justifiable expectation that he would not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events. Hence, "the predicate for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in Wolff v. McDonnell [was] totally nonexistent." Meachum v. Fano, supra at 427 U. S. 226-227.

Following Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes, we continued to recognize that state statutes may grant prisoners liberty interests that invoke due process protections when prisoners are transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978), summarily aff'g 462 F.Supp. 397 (ND Cal.1976). Similarly, in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, we held that state law granted petitioners a sufficient expectancy of parole to entitle them to some measure of constitutional protection with respect to parole decisions.

We think the District Court properly understood and applied these decisions. Section 83-180(1) provides that, if a designated physician finds that a prisoner "suffers from a mental disease or defect" that "cannot be given proper treatment" in prison, the Director of Correctional Services may transfer a prisoner to a mental hospital. The District Court also found that, in practice, prisoners are transferred to a mental hospital only if it is determined that they suffer from a mental disease or defect that cannot adequately be treated within the penal complex. This "objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex practice," that

Page 445 U. S. 490

a prisoner would not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect that could not be adequately treated in the prison, gave Jones a liberty interest that entitled him to the benefits of appropriate procedures in connection with determining the conditions that warranted his transfer to a mental hospital. Under our cases, this conclusion of the District Court is unexceptionable.
Appellants maintain that any state-created liberty interest at Jones had was completely satisfied once a physician or psychologist designated by the director made the findings required by § 8180(1), and that Jones was not entitled to any procedural protections. [Footnote 6] But if the State grants a prisoner

Page 445 U. S. 491

a right or expectation that adverse action will not be taken against him except upon the occurrence of specified behavior,

"the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed."

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 418 U. S. 558. These minimum requirements being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.
On June 7, 2012 those email,memo, rubber stamping, and email to Mississippi Department of Records ,Director Sherry Robinson was a matter of federal law.

In Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff, the States had adopted their own procedures for determining whether conditions warranting revocation of parole, probation, or good-time credits had occurred; yet we held that those procedures were constitutionally inadequate. In like manner, Nebraska's reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist for determining whether the conditions warranting a transfer exist neither removes the prisoner's interest from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution.

B

The District Court was also correct in holding that, independently of § 83-180(1), the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections. The issue is whether, after a conviction for robbery, Jones retained a residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without complying with minimum requirements of due process.

We have recognized that, for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 405 U. S. 509 (1972), and, in

Page 445 U. S. 492

consequence, "requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 441 U. S. 425 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 422 U. S. 580 (1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring). The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual," and that,

"[w]hether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something else . . . , we recognize that it can occur, and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual."

Addington v. Texas, supra at 441 U. S. 425-426. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 442 U. S. 600 (1979). Also, "[a]mong the historic liberties" protected by the Due Process Clause is the "right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 430 U. S. 673 (1977). Compelled treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs, to which the District Court found Jones was exposed in this case, was a proper factor to be weighed by the District Court. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra at 441 U. S. 427.

The District Court, in its findings, was sensitive to these concerns:

"[T]he fact of greater limitations on freedom of action at the Lincoln Regional Center, the fact that a transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center has some stigmatizing consequences, and the fact that additional mandatory behavior modification systems are used at the Lincoln Regional Center combine to make the transfer a 'major change in the conditions of confinement' amounting to a 'grievous loss' to the inmate."

Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.Supp. at 573.

Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally infringed absent compliance with the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.

Page 445 U. S. 493

We conclude that a convicted felon also is entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to have a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital.

Undoubtedly, a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence extinguish a defendant's right to freedom from confinement. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 7. Such a conviction and sentence sufficiently extinguish a defendant's liberty "to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 422 U. S. 224 (emphasis deleted). It is also true that changes in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner are not, alone, sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause "[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 242.

Appellants maintain that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital is within the range of confinement justified by imposition of a prison sentence, at least after certification by a qualified person that a prisoner suffers from a mental disease or defect. We cannot agree. None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime entitles a State not only to confine the convicted person, but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental hospital. Such consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime. Our cases recognize as much, and reflect an understanding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual. Bastrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 406 U. S. 724-725 (1972). A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's

Page 445 U. S. 494

right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections.

In light of the findings made by the District Court, Jones' involuntary transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center pursuant to § 83-180, for the purpose of psychiatric treatment, implicated a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Many of the restrictions on the prisoner's freedom of action at the Lincoln Regional Center, by themselves, might not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest retained by a prisoner, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 418 U. S. 572, n.19; cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 425 U. S. 323 (1976). But here, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.

IV

The District Court held that, to afford sufficient protection to the liberty interest it had identified, the State was required to observe the following minimum procedures before transferring a prisoner to a mental hospital:

"A. Written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a mental hospital is being considered;"

"B. A hearing, sufficiently after the notice to permit the prisoner to prepare, at which disclosure to the prisoner is made of the evidence being relied upon for the transfer and at which an opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence is given;"

"C. An opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state, except

Page 445 U. S. 495

upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination;"

"D. An independent decisionmaker;"

"E. A written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for transferring the inmate;"

"F. Availability of legal counsel, furnished by the state, if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own; and"

"G. Effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights."

437 F.Supp. at 575.

A

We think the District Court properly identified and weighed the relevant factors in arriving at its judgment. Concededly, the interest of the State in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong. The interest of the prisoner in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome treatment is also powerful, however; and as the District Court found, the risk of error in making the determinations required by § 83-180 is substantial enough to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error.

We recognize that the inquiry involved in determining whether or not to transfer an inmate to a mental hospital for treatment involves a question that is essentially medical. The question whether an individual is mentally ill and cannot be treated in prison "turns on the meaning of the facts, which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 429. The medical nature of the inquiry, however, does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is precisely "[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses" that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. Id. at 441 U. S. 430.

Because prisoners facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital are threatened with immediate deprivation of liberty

Page 445 U. S. 496

interests thy are currently enjoying and because of the inherent risk of a mistaken transfer, the District Court properly determined that procedures similar to those required by the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), were appropriate in the circumstances present here.

The notice requirement imposed by the District Court no more than recognizes that notice is essential to afford the prisoner an opportunity to challenge the contemplated action and to understand the nature of what is happening to him. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra at 418 U. S. 564. Furthermore, in view of the nature of the determinations that must accompany the transfer to a mental hospital, we think each of the elements of the hearing specified by the District Court was appropriate. The interests of the State in avoiding disruption was recognized by limiting in appropriate circumstances the prisoner's right to call witnesses, to confront and cross-examine. The District Court also avoided unnecessary intrusion into either medical or correctional judgments by providing that the independent decisionmaker conducting the transfer hearing need not come from outside the prison or hospital administration. 437 F.Supp. at 574.

B *
The District Court did go beyond the requirements imposed by prior cases by holding that counsel must be made available to inmates facing transfer hearings if they are financially unable to furnish their own. We have not required the automatic appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners facing other deprivations of liberty, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 790; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra at 418 U. S. 569-570; but we have recognized that prisoners who are illiterate and uneducated have a greater need for assistance in exercising their rights. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra at 411 U. S. 786-787; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra at 418 U. S. 570. A prisoner thought to be suffering from a

Page 445 U. S. 497

mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill.

V

Because MR JUSTICE POWELL, while believing that Jones was entitled to competent help at the hearing, would not require the State to furnish a licensed attorney to aid him, the judgment below is affirmed as modified to conform with the separate opinion filed by MR. JUSTICE POWELL.

So ordered.

* This part is joined only by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR JUSTICE STEVENS.

[Footnote 1]

Section 83-180(1) provides:

"When a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a physical disease or defect, or when a physician or psychologist designated by the director finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief executive officer may order such person to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If the physician or psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper treatment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in the Department of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available. A person who is so transferred shall remain subject to the jurisdiction and custody of the Department of Correctional Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary."

[Footnote 2]

Section 83-180(3) provides:

"When two psychiatrists designated by the Director of Correctional Services find that a person about to be released or discharged from any facility suffers from a mental disease or defect of such a nature that his release or discharge will endanger the public safety or the safety of the offender, the director shall transfer him to, or if he has already been transferred, permit him to remain in, a psychiatric facility in the Department of Public Institutions and shall promptly commence proceedings applicable to the civil commitment and detention of persons suffering from such disease or defect."

[Footnote 3]

After initially certifying this case as a class action, the District Court decertified the class, but permitted intervention by three individual plaintiffs, including Jones. The District Court subsequently dismissed the claims of all plaintiffs except Jones, who is the sole appellee in this Court.

[Footnote 4]

The statute authorizing the convening of a three-judge court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), was repealed by Pub.L. 9381, 90 Stat. 1119, effective for actions commenced after August 12, 1976. Because the instant action was filed on November 12, 1975, the three-judge court was properly convened.

[Footnote 5]

Because Jones has not completed serving his sentence, he remains subject to the transfer procedures he challenges, unlike the plaintiff in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975), where a challenge to parole procedures was held to be moot because plaintiff had completed his sentence and there was no longer any likelihood whatsoever that he would again be subjected to the parole procedures he challenged.

[Footnote 6]

A majority of the Justices rejected an identical position in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 416 U. S. 166-167 (1974) (opinion of POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.), 416 U. S. 177-178 (opinion of WHITE, J.), 416 U. S. 210-211 (opinion of MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and BRENNAN, JJ.). As MR. JUSTICE POWELL's opinion observed:

"The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee's interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statutory procedures for discharge, and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the nature of appellee's property interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in [Board of Regents v.] Roth[, 408 U. S. 564 (1972)] and [Perry v.] Sindermann[, 408 U. S. 593 (1972)]. Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that, whatever the nature of an individual's statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, supra."

Id. at 416 U. S. 166-167.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part.

I join the opinion of the Court except for 445 U. S. I agree with Part IV-B insofar as the Court holds that qualified and independent assistance must be provided to an inmate who is threatened with involuntary transfer to a state mental hospital. I do not agree, however, that the requirement of independent assistance demands that a licensed attorney be provided. [Footnote 2/1]

Page 445 U. S. 498

I

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), my opinion for the Court held that counsel is not necessarily required at a probation revocation hearing. In reaching this decision, the Court recognized both the effects of providing counsel to each probationer and the likely benefits to be derived from the assistance of counsel. "The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding [would] alter significantly the nature of the proceeding," id. at 411 U. S. 787, because the hearing would inevitably become more adversary. We noted that probationers would not always need counsel, because, in most hearings, the essential facts are undisputed. In lieu of a per se rule, we held that the necessity of providing counsel should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In particular, we stressed that factors governing the decision to provide counsel include (i) the existence of factual disputes or issues which are "complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present," and (ii) "whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself." Id. at 411 U. S. 790, 411 U. S. 791.

Consideration of these factors, and particularly the capability of the inmate, persuades me that the Court is correct that independent assistance must be provided to an inmate before he may be transferred involuntarily to a mental hospital. The essence of the issue in an involuntary commitment proceeding will be the mental health of the inmate. The resolution of factual disputes will be less important than the ability to understand and analyze expert psychiatric testimony that is often expressed in language relatively incomprehensible to laymen. It is unlikely that an inmate threatened with involuntary transfer to mental hospitals will possess the competence or training to protect adequately his own interest in these state-initiated proceeding. And the circumstances of being imprisoned without normal access to others who may assist him places an additional handicap upon an inmate's ability to represent himself. I therefore agree

Page 445 U. S. 499

that due process requires the provision of assistance to an inmate threatened with involuntary transfer to a mental hospital.

II

I do not believe, however, that an inmate must always be supplied with a licensed attorney. "[D]ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 408 U. S. 481 (1972). See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 424 U. S. 334-335 (1976). Our decisions defining the necessary qualifications for an impartial decisionmaker demonstrate that the requirements of due process turn on the nature of the determination which must be made.

"Due Process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer."

Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 442 U. S. 607 (1979). In that case, we held that due process is satisfied when a staff physician determines whether a child may be voluntarily committed to a state mental institution by his parents. That holding was based upon recognition that the issues of civil commitment "are essentially medical in nature," and that "neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.'" Id. at 442 U. S. 607, 442 U. S. 609, quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal.3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 408 U. S. 489; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 397 U. S. 271 (1970).

In my view, the principle that due process does not always require a law-trained decisionmaker supports the ancillary conclusion that due process may be satisfied by the provision of a qualified and independent adviser who is not a lawyer. As in Parham v. J.R., the issue here is essentially medical. Under state law, a prisoner may be transferred only if he "suffers from a mental disease or defect" and "cannot be given proper treatment" in the prison complex. Neb.Rev.Stat.

Page 445 U. S. 500

§ 83-180(1) (1976). The opinion of the Court allows a nonlawyer to act as the impartial decisionmaker in the transfer proceeding. Ante at 445 U. S. 496. [Footnote 2/2]

The essence of procedural due process is a fair hearing. I do not think that the fairness of an informal hearing designed to determine a medical issue requires participation by lawyers. Due process merely requires that the State provide an inmate with qualified and independent assistance. Such assistance may be provided by a licensed psychiatrist or other mental health professional. Indeed, in view of the nature of the issue involved in the transfer hearing, a person possessing such professional qualifications normally would be preferred. As the Court notes,
"[t]he question whether an individual is mentally ill and cannot be treated in prison 'turns on the meaning of the facts, which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.'"

Ante at 445 U. S. 495, quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 441 U. S. 429 (1979). I would not exclude, however, the possibility that the required assistance may be rendered by competent laymen in some cases. The essential requirements are that the person provided by the State be competent and independent, and that he be free to act solely in the inmate's best interest.

In sum, although the State is free to appoint a licensed attorney to represent an inmate, it is not constitutionally required to do so. Due process will be satisfied so long as an inmate facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital is provided qualified and independent assistance.

[Footnote 2/1]

I also agree with the Court's holding that this case is not moot. The question is whether appellee faces a substantial threat that he will again be transferred to a state mental hospital. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 422 U. S. 930-932 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 415 U. S. 458-460 (1974); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 410 U. S. 188 (1973). He was involuntarily transferred from the prison complex to a mental institution, and thereafter paroled upon condition that he continue to receive psychiatric treatment. When he violated parole, he was returned to prison. The State advises us that appellee's "history of mental illness indicates a serious threat to his own safety, as well as to that of others," and "there is a very real expectation" of transfer if the District Court injunction were removed. App. to Juris.Statement 24. The District Court concluded that appellee is under threat of transfer. In these circumstances, it is clear that a live controversy remains in which appellee has a personal stake. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 444 U. S. 581-583 (1980).

[Footnote 2/2]

The District Court specifically held that "a judicial officer is not required, and the decisionmaker need not be from outside the prison or hospital administration." Miller v. Vitek, 437 F.Supp. 569, 574 (Neb.1977) (three-judge court).

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

It seems clear to me that this case is now moot. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment and remand the case to

Page 445 U. S. 501

the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36.

As the Court points out, this is not a class action, and the appellee is now incarcerated in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex with an anticipated release date in March 1982. See ante at 445 U. S. 485-487, and n. 3. In that status, the appellee is simply one of thousands of Nebraska prisoners, with no more standing than any other to attack the constitutionality of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-180(1) (1976) on the sole basis of the mere possibility that someday that statute might be invoked to transfer him to another institution.

Although the appellee was once transferred in accord with § 83-180(1), there is no demonstrated probability that that will ever happen again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147. And this case is not one that, by its nature falls, within the ambit of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to established principles of mootness. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498; Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U. S. 115. If the appellee should again be threatened with transfer under the allegedly infirm statute, there will be ample time to reach the merits of his claim.

"'To adjudicate a cause which no longer exists is a proceeding which this Court uniformly has declined to entertain.' Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216, 261 U. S. 217-218."

Oil Workers v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363, 316 U. S. 371.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that this case is not properly before us. I write separately to express my own reasons for reaching that conclusion.

The claimed harm that gave birth to this lawsuit was the alleged deprivation of liberty attending appellee's transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center. It is clear to me that that asserted injury disappeared, at the latest, when appellee was

Page 445 U. S. 502
granted parole. [Footnote 3/1] Cf. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395 (1975). So did any immediate threat that that injury would be suffered again. Appellee has been returned to custody, however, and the

Page 445 U. S. 503

parties agree that his reincarceration, coupled with his history of mental problems, has brought the controversy back to life.

Given these facts, the issue is not so much one of mootness as one of ripeness. At most, although I think otherwise, it is a case presenting a "mixed question" of ripeness and mootness, hinging on the possibility that the challenged procedures will be applied again to appellee. This Court has confronted mixed questions of this kind in cases presenting issues "capable of repetition, yet evading review," see, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), and Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), and in cases concerning the cessation of challenged conduct during the pendency of litigation, see, e.g., Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 323 U. S. 43 (1944). In those contexts, the Court has lowered the ripeness threshold so as to preclude manipulation by the parties or the mere passage of time from frustrating judicial review. MR JUSTICE STEWART correctly observes, and the Court apparently concedes, however, that the "capable of repetition" doctrine does not apply here. Neither does the liberal rule applied in "voluntary cessation" cases, since the current state of affairs is in no way the product of the appellants' voluntary discontinuation of their challenged conduct. [Footnote 3/2] Certainly it is not the result of any effort on the part of the appellants to avoid review by this Court. Thus, since these mixed mootness/ripeness rules are inapplicable, this case presents for me nothing more than a plain, old-fashioned question of ripeness. [Footnote 3/3]

Page 445 U. S. 504

The Court's cases lay down no mechanistic test for determining whether a dispute is ripe for adjudication. But past formulations are uniformly more rigorous than the one the Court now applies. The Court has observed that "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not, in itself, show a present case or controversy," O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 414 U. S. 495 (1974), and that "general assertions or inferences" that illegal conduct will recur do not render a case ripe. Id. at 414 U. S. 497. "A hypothetical threat is not enough." Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 90 (1947). There must be "actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 408 U. S. 15 (1972). See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 410 U. S. 617 (1973) (requiring "some threatened or actual injury"); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 262 U. S. 488 (1923) (requiring that the litigant "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury"). A "substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality" is required. Glolden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 394 U. S. 108 (1969), quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 312 U. S. 273 (1941).

Page 445 U. S. 505

Applying these principles, I have difficulty in perceiving an existing "case or controversy" here. Since our remand, the state officials have indicated nothing more than that they have a general right to apply their statute, and to apply it to appellee, if necessary. [Footnote 3/4] They have not expressed a present intent or desire to transfer appellee to a mental facility pursuant to the challenged provisions. Nor have they suggested that they may transfer appellee to the Lincoln Regional Center now on the basis of the diagnosis made five years ago. And they have not suggested that they would subject appellee immediately to a "fresh" psychiatric evaluation if the District Court's injunction were lifted. The appellee has represented that he "does not reside in the psychiatric unit of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, nor is he receiving or accepting psychiatric treatment." Brief for Appellee 11-12. The brief containing that statement was filed some six months ago, and some nine months after the revocation of appellee's parole.

In sum, for all that appears, appellee has been assimilated once again into the general prison population, and appellants, at least at this time, are content to leave him where he is. [Footnote 3/5] Given these facts, determining whether prison officials within two years again will seek to send appellee to a mental institution

Page 445 U. S. 506

"takes this into the area of speculation and conjecture." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 497. Cf. Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U. S. 222 (1954).

It is for these reasons that I would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court with directions to dismiss the complaint.

[Footnote 3/1]

The Court does not appear to share this view. It states that, even while at the Veterans' Administration Hospital, appellee Jones "insisted that he was receiving treatment for mental illness against his will." Ante at 445 U. S. 486. It adds that appellee was "paroled, but only on condition that he accept psychiatric treatment." Ibid. The Court does not identify the precise import of these facts, but a fair inference is that they are meant to suggest that this case -- even during the time of appellee's parole -- might properly have been pursued on the theory that the appellee was continuing to feel the effects of the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in receiving inpatient care at the Veterans' Administration Hospital.

I cannot accept this suggestion. First, its premise appears to be faulty. The District Court did not find, and it does not appear clearly in the record, that the parole board's offer or appellee's acceptance of parole was in any way related to his prior transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center. Appellee chose to accept conditional parole. Moreover, at the time appellee elected to go on parole, he was being housed at the penal complex, not at the Lincoln Regional Center. Thus, it is not surprising that the District Court based its finding of nonmootness solely on its conclusion that appellee -- notwithstanding his conditioned release -- was "under threat of being transferred to the state mental hospital under § 83-180." App. to Juris.Statement 24. Second, the "continuing injury" theory seems to me to be incorrect as a matter of law. Appellee did not seek or evince any interest in seeking release from the Veterans' Administration Hospital, and a declaration that his initial transfer had been illegal would have neither justified nor predictably led to appellee's removal from that facility. In other words, after accepting the conditional grant of parole, appellee could no longer show, as required by the "case or controversy" requirement, "that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 422 U. S. 508 (1975).

The Court also finds some support for its holding in the fact that vacating the District Court's order would remove the declaration that the challenged procedures "afforded an inadequate basis for declaring Jones to be mentally ill." Ante at 445 U. S. 487. If the Court, by this statement, means to imply that appellee's suit is somehow mootness-proof due to the continuing stigma resulting from the transfer to the mental hospital, I cannot accept that sweeping proposition. The Court has never suggested that the "collateral consequences" doctrine of Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), which saves an action challenging the validity of a conviction after a prisoner has served his sentence, also saves a challenge to a commitment by a patient who has been released from a mental hospital. Nor does the logic of Sibron -- focusing on tangible and remediable collateral consequences, such as use of a prior conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime, or to impeach credibility if one appears as a witness -- comfortably extend to the claim of a former mental patient. See id. at 392 U. S. 55 (referring to "adverse collateral legal consequences").

[Footnote 3/2]

The decisions to award and revoke parole were made by the Nebraska Parole Board, not by appellants.

[Footnote 3/3]

It is not clear whether the Court views this as a "voluntary cessation" case. It nowhere expressly relies on the doctrine, and does not explain what factors might justify characterizing appellee's present situation as the result of voluntary cessation of illegal conduct by appellants. On the other hand, each of the three decisions cited by the Court to support its application of a "creampuff" ripeness standard, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 440 U. S. 631 (1979); United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 393 U. S. 203 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 345 U. S. 633 (1953), pivoted on the presence of "voluntary cessation." It is therefore unclear whether the Court deems this a "voluntary cessation" case (without explaining why), or deems the "no reasonable expectation of recurrence" standard -- to date a litmus carefully confined by a policy-tailored and principled "voluntary cessation" rule -- applicable to an amorphous cluster of facts having nothing to do with parties' artful dodging of well founded litigation. In either event, the Court's analysis invites the criticism, increasingly voiced, that this Court's decisions on threshold issues "are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim." Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L.Rev. 663 (1977).

[Footnote 3/4]

Appellants, to be sure, have announced their intention to continue to use the challenged procedures. That fact, however, is of small, if any, significance, for it is hardly surprising to hear state officials say that they plan to abide by the State's own laws. See Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 330 U. S. 91 (1947) ("the existence of the law and the regulations" does not alone render a suit ripe). Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961) (desuetude statute).

[Footnote 3/5]

I do not go so far as MR. JUSTICE STEWART does when he says that appellee is "simply one of thousands of Nebraska prisoners." Ante at 445 U. S. 501. For purposes of the "case or controversy" requirement, appellee differs from his fellow inmates in two relevant respects: he has a recent history of perceived psychiatric problems, and, in fact, he was previously transferred pursuant to the challenged statutes. Cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 496 ("Of course, past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury").

WHEREFORE ENGENDERED SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES STIGMATIZEING LIFELONG PUBLIC DANGEROUSNESS PRESUMPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY manipulated by MDOC PRISON OFFICIALS OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPER B. EPPS that such powers of MDOC to punish for conviction at KO2-0151E for the term of incarceration did become VIOLATIVE of involuntary commitment USCA 14 PROCESS DUE, AND RESULTED FROM A NEVER SUBMITTED ARP AT GREENE COUNTY PRISON SOME NUMBEROUS AS 10-27 FORCED MEDICATIONS, whereafter Lisa Herdon did after slapping petitioner with her shoe with about four to six women correctional officer commenced to beat with fists and kicks after less that ten minutes ago petitoner being assualted by four to six men correctional officers by corporal punishment within less than twenty minutes of a episode of forced medication by Doctor Sandy video conference to Nurse Kimble at Grenee County Prison,WHICH ASSUALT AND RACISM INDICATIVE THEREIN INDICATE A PLANNED "GENDER" ASSUALT BY MEN THEN LADIES AFTER AND DURING LIFE THREATNING AND BRAIN ALTERING MEDICATION WHICH ADMINISTRATION OF SUCH MEDICATION was through walk of Lisa Herdon to Medication ward at GREENE COUNTY.
That a rule violation report was entered into the petitioner file but THERE WAS NOT SIGNATURE OF COMMISIONER EPPS OR REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF TRUSTY STATUS.
As such petitoner VIOLATIVE of clearly established VITEK PROCEEDURES due THE AUGUST 8, 2008 COMMITMENT WAS UNLAWFUL AND ANY AND ALL DURATIONS COMMITTED THEREAT AND UP UNTIL FEBUARY 13, 2015 WAS LIFE THREATNING.
That the June 2, 2012 email caused SEVERE MISTRUST FOR ANY AND ALL DOCTORS OF TREATMENT AND THEIR FORCED OR NON INFORMED CONSENTUAL STATEWIDE SYSTEMATIC PUNITIVE APPROACH OF MDOC, GEO, AND MTC SHOWN BY THE JULY 12, 2012 ACT TO FURTHER A 36 MONTH DEFRUADING OF LIFE,LIBERTY, AND NUMBEROUS CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUIONAL PRIVILLEGES AND RIGHTS.
THAT On JUNE 7, 2012 BY AND THROUGH EMAIL DIRECTIVE AND STATEWIDE OFFICIAL DOOMED TO FAIL DISCRIMATORY USE OF ANTI PSYCHOTIC SOON AFTER A 36 MONTH INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OR VIOLATIVE OF MISS ANN CODE 47-5-99 TO -104; USCA 14 DEFEDANT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI BY AND THROUGH
1. Defendant COMMISIONER of Corrections,appointed by State Governor, single Email directive granted MDOC custody and control of petitioner psychiatric findings and
2. SAAG failure to discover and abolish email effects render consent to practice slavery by SAAG or its other officials not identified at the email as such :

(A) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a United States court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to be brought UNTIL NO. 15-60266 IS FINALIZED,

(B) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest is as follows:
1. That I have previously presented a claim to this the United States Claims Court and the substance of those claims are at issue,
2. That USA ATTORNEY STEVE MACKO ansewred that complaint against the UNITED STATES while a duly autorized sentence of Lawrence County, Mississippi K02-151E which was filed while STATE OF MISSISSIPPI WAS INFLICTING VITEK V. JONES,ID-- WITHOUT any requirements of due process set out at VITEK V. JONES in that the State's alleged wrongful behavior,I.e. SPECIFICALLY TRANSFER FROM PRISON FENERAL POPULATION TO PSYCHIATRIC SETTING OF EAST MISSISSIPPI CORRECTIONAL FACILTY (3) recorded and separate dates on or about :
(1) August 8, 2008 initial transfer to conceal SMCI SHOE SLAPPING MATTER,
(2) June 7,2012 email scandalous 36 month excessive and prolongment And
(3)January 1, 2015 final transfer to the EAST MISSISSIPPI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY which

could not reasonably be expected to recur. Pp. 445 U. S. 486-487 , however at stake is the DEFENDANT UNITED STATES HANDLING OF VITEX VIOLATIONS AND E-mail which caused:
The above three (3) involuntary transfers of CLAIMANT to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pp. 445 U. S. 487-494 at minimum on the June 7, 2012 email scandalous handling involuntarily VIOLATIVE of USCA 13 INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE WITHOUT PROTECTIONS, JUSTIFICATION,OR LEGAL IMPLICATIONS As shown at an E-MAIL STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FEDERAL OR STATE AGENT TOMMY D. GOODWIN which although Defending MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMWNT OF CORRECTIONS FAILED TO CEASE LOSS OF 36 MONTHS, AS OTHER MISSISSIPPI AGO'S SAAG'S presented a sham and mockery of such email on June 2,2012 and it it affects through Court and CLAIMANT Inquisition after June 7,2012 loss of thirty six month on the morning of JUNE 7, 2012 DISCHAGE FROM" EMCF" WITH AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES TO AT MINIMUM:
1.To emancipate or declare illegal the taking and the process of taking of freedom on JUNE 7,2012 THIRTY SIX MONTHS GOOD TIME AND DECLARE SUCH A CYBERCRIME AGAINT THE CLAIMANT prior to APRIL 14,2014 SPEARS HEARING UPON THE NO.3:13-CV------CWR-LRA
2. OR IMMEDIATELY UPON E-MAIL DISCOVERY THEREAFTER THE SPEARS HEARING BY CONSOLIDATION AND "JOINT OR DUAL" NOTICE TO SAAG'S OD MISSISSIPPI TO CEASE THE EMAIL EFFECTS OF 36 MONTHS OR OTHERWISE FREE THE CLAIMANT.
3.That even though and despite of the EMAIL EFFECTS OF LOSS OF LIFE,LIBERTY,PROPERTY,AND NUMBEROUS OTHER VITAL COMMERENCE OF FREEEDOM AND WORK, THE UNITED STATES HAVE UNCOVERED ONE BILLION IN CORRUPT CONTRACTUAL BIDDING AND BRIBES WITH KICKBACKS......AND EVEN THOUGH THE UNITED STATES KNOWS OR SHOULD KNOW:
Defendant CHRISTOPER B. EPPS did 'sale at price of twelve thousand per month"36 months of CLAIMANT PRISON TERM IN THE EFFECT OF PROLONGMENT FOR 36 MONTHS,
Which the DEFENDANT UNITED STATES SHOULD OF KNOWN OF THIS 36 MONTHS MATTER BY AND THROUGH:
1.THREE ARPS EMCF 12,45,AND 84 filed from EMCF AND OTHER INMATE LEGAL ASSISTANCE MAIL JUNE 7,2012 TO DECEMBER 18,2013 OR OF THE THREE FCTA CLAIMS DISCARDED OR UNASWERED DURING THE COMMONLY CALLED 2008-2017 OBAMA ADMINISTARTION.
2. Authorized or unauthorized WIRE AND ORAL INTERCEPTION OF INSPECTION BY JUDGE ALTERATIONS before whom that initial compliant was submitted as early as 2010 with exhaustion of Inheriant military discharge and record corrections which yet:
A. Should indicate Disabilities at discharge and audit 1994-1997 payments to CLAIMANT as error,
B. Should indicate backpay for unlawful discharge or unlawful service With a felony conviction when no investing or report of MISSISSIPPI NATIONAL GUARD OCCURED, AND SENTENCEING ORDER OF FORREST COUNTY DOES NOT HAVE REMOVAL FROM MISSISSIPPI NATIONAL GUARD OR NOTIFICATION THEREIN WHICH INDICATES A STATE CLEAR "HAVE IT BOTH WAYS STANDARD"
In That KO2-0151E SENTENCING ORDER TOOK PRESIDENCE IN 2003 LAWRENCE COUNTY BUT WHERE CLAIMANT 1994 SENTENCING ORDER DID NOT ORDER MILITARY DISCHARGE BY WRITTEN ORDER ANY SUCH TWO YEAR LATER DISCHAGE CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND ANY SUCH DISCHARGE IS NO DISCHARGE AT ALL, WHENCE THE CLAIMANT FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY HAS NOT BEEN DISCHARGED IN NOVEMBER 1997 AS SUCH IS THE CLAIMANT BACK TIME PREMISED IN THIS MATTER.
3. That the JUNE 2,2012 EMAIL SCHEME UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEVE PREMISED UOON GOOGLE DATA INVOLVES USCA ONE CHILLING OF THE INITIAL CLAIM TO THIS COURT.
4.That In Federal Division of Mississippi is the only State where I have proceeded and meet the first notice of three-strikes was served in 2009-2010 by DISTRICT COURT TSL BUT NO PRIOR ORDER OF THREE STRIKES EXISTS OR HAS EVER BEEN SERVED UPON THIS THE CLAIMANT.



4. That no State OR FEDERAL Court has squarely address the email at issue or determined whether it's a STATE AND\OR FEDERAL POLICY ACT OR POSIONUOS ACTS OF THE ONE BILLION DOLLAR CORRUPTION a liberty interest rooted in TRANSFER FOR 36 MONTHS MENTAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION NOTABLY "THE SAME BODY AND BRAIN OF PREVIOUS MILTARY TRAINING AND SPECILIZATION" under which a prisoner could reasonably expect that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital EMCF without a finding that he was suffering from a mental illness for which he could not secure adequate treatment in prison. The State's attacks by officers upon the CLAIMANT WAS NOT DUE TO ANY reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist CONSENTUALLY OR PERSERVED for determining whether the conditions warranting transfer exist neither removes the prisoner's interest from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution. Pp. 445 U. S. 488-491.

5.That the three (3) transfers of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital WAS NOT accompanied by appropriate procedural protections.
6.That the (3)three Involuntary commitments to EMCF a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual.
7.That while a conviction and sentence extinguish an individual's right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence that was ten years in trusty status and other good time credits shortened by MISS ANN CODE 47-5-138.1
8.That para 7 do not authorize the State to classify CLAIMANT as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections --as this below sets forth as required by VITEK V. JONES,ID.
8 That the CLAIMANT SUFFERED AND CONTINUE TO SUFFER the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment.
9. That such coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections. Pp. 491-494 as in this matter of trust wherein:
"A SHAM AND MOCKERY OF MISSISSIPPI COURT IN A 36 MONTHS DEPRIVIATION SLAVERY SCHEME FURTHERED BY FORCED PSYCHIATRY INJECTIONS OF ANTI-PSYCHOTIC CONSTITUTES ASSUALT AS THE LIKE OF THE SMCI SHOE SLAPPING OF THE CLAIMANT THAT INITIATED TRANSFER TO EMCF IN 2008 THAT SUCH 36 MONTHS AT ISSUE IS SHIFTED AS A LUNATIC MATTER-AND IS HEREBY ASSERTED AGAINT THE DEFENDANT UNITED STATES..

(10. THAT although the State's interest in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong Federal authorities MUST STOP, CEASE,OR TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURE TO FREE ANY HUMAN FOUND IN A VITEK FACILITY OF STATE CORRECTIONAL CONTRACTING WHEN SHOWN AND DOCUMENTED the CLAIMANT WAS AFTER JUNE 7,2012 AND\ OR AT LATEST FEBUARY 13, 2013 being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome treatment which included FORCED ADMINISTRATION OF ANTI PSYCHOTIC ON JULY 12,2012.
11. That the aburt morning of discharge removal of 36 months is substantial enough to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error. P. 445 U. S. 495 as such committed the second INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT FOR 36 MONTHS,WHICH BUT FOR SHAM AND MOCKERY NO COURT HAS SQUARELY NULL AND VOIDED THE EMAIL AND IT EFFECTS.

12. That the medical nature of the inquiry as to whether or not to transfer a prisoner to a mental hospital does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. P. 445 U. S. 495 on the above (3)three separate occasions.Page 445 U. S. 482

13.That because CLAIMANT WAS facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital threatened with immediate deprivation of liberty interests, and because of the risk of mistaken transfer, the District Court improperly determined that certain procedural protections, including notice and an adversary hearing, were appropriate in the circumstances present in this case. Pp. 445 U. S. 495-496.seeERIC DEJUAN JONES V. WARDEN JERRY BUSCHLER NO. 3:13-CV-1039-CWR-FKB (EVEN IF TAKEN OR MERE LACK OF RECOCORD KEEPING)DISPOSITIONAL STATEMENT IN MAGISTRATE F.KEITH BALL.
14. That on the three transfers at issue MAY HAVE BEEN CUASED BY UNITED STATES MILITARY ORDERS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, OR VETERAN COURT ORDERS AND THUS DISCOVERABLE UPON PERPETUATION OF THESE SUBJECTS.


(C) the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons to perpetuate it;

(D) the names or a description of the persons whom the petitioner expects to be adverse parties and their addresses, so far as known; and

(E) the name, address, and expected substance of the testimony of each deponent.

(2) Notice and Service. At least 21 days before the hearing date, the petitioner must serve each expected adverse party with a copy of the petition and a notice stating the time and place of the hearing. The notice may be served either inside or outside the district or state in the manner provided in Rule 4. If that service cannot be made with reasonable diligence on an expected adverse party, the court may order service by publication or otherwise. The court must appoint an attorney to represent persons not served in the manner provided in Rule 4 and to cross-examine the deponent if an unserved person is not otherwise represented. If any expected adverse party is a minor or is incompetent, Rule 17(c) applies.

(3) Order and Examination. If satisfied that perpetuating the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, the court must issue an order that designates or describes the persons whose depositions may be taken, specifies the subject matter of the examinations, and states whether the depositions will be taken orally or by written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken under these rules, and the court may issue orders like those authorized by Rules 34 and 35. A reference in these rules to the court where an action is pending means, for purposes of this rule, the court where the petition for the deposition was filed.

(4) Using the Deposition. A deposition to perpetuate testimony may be used under Rule 32(a) in any later-filed district-court action involving the same subject matter if the deposition either was taken under these rules or, although not so taken, would be admissible in evidence in the courts of the state where it was taken.
Wherefore prior to any loss of timeliness or delays such info is made available as set forth above.
TO: MISSISSIPPI COMMISIONER OF INSURANCE
Universal Citation: MS Code § 83-65-103 (2013)
For the purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Insurance.

(b) "Service contract holder" means a person who purchases or otherwise obtains a vehicle service contract.

(c) "Vehicle service contract" means a contract or agreement that undertakes to perform or provide repair or replacement service, or provide payment for that service, for the operational or structural failure of a motor vehicle due to a defect in materials, workmanship or normal wear and tear.

(d) "Provider" means a person who issues, makes or provides a vehicle service contract.

(e) "Reimbursement insurance policy" means a policy of insurance providing reimbursement coverage for all services which the provider is legally obligated to provide under the terms of vehicle service contracts issued or sold by the provider.

(f) "Services" means the repair, replacement or maintenance of property or indemnification for repair, replacement or maintenance for the operational or structural failure of a motor vehicle due to a defect in materials, workmanship or normal wear and tear.
Chapter 65 - REGULATION OF VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACTS
§ 83-65-109 - Issuance, sale, or offer for sale of reimbursement insurance policy


Universal Citation: MS Code § 83-65-109 (2013)
A reimbursement insurance policy shall not be issued, sold, or offered for sale in this state unless the reimbursement insurance policy conspicuously states that the issuer of the policy shall provide on behalf of the provider all services which the provider is legally obligated to provide according to the provider's contractual obligations under the vehicle service contracts issued or sold by the provider.

CLAIM
1.42 USCS SECTION 1985(1) PLANNED,SCHEMED,AND AGREED SALE OF A VOID LIFETIME VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD OF INVALIDITY AND/ REIMBURSEMENT INSURANCE POLICY REQUIRED OF MISSISSIPPI ANNOTATED CODE 83-65-109 AT CONTRACTING FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR TRANSFER OF NON-INSURED VIP REWARD WITH FURTEHRANCE INTENT OR PROVOCATIONAL AND RETAILITIONAL INJURIOUS INTENT TO BE STAGGED "UPON SERVICE REDEMPTION" AS A RESULT HAVE IN EFFECT THUS FURTHER REMOVE TRUST OR POSITIONS OF CLAIMANT IN PRISON MUSIC INCORPORATED NOW PMINK OR BUSINESS AFFLIATES,NEW INVESTORS OR "rappers signing or otherwise' as discussed at sale , And/or in upcoming DEFRUADING of Estate (see annexed)

2.FURTHERANCE OF THE REMOVAL OF TRUST BY AND THROUGH:
A.Failure to notify Progressive Gulf Company Insurance of a VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT which if true would AID AND ASSIST ANY OFFICIAL POLICY BY LOANER CAR PROVISION DURING SERVICE WITH A FREE CAR WASH,NITORGEN,FREE FUEL which had Progressive been notified by and through "documents or proof of new car purchase" costs would have been averted to CLAIMANT.
3.FAILURE TO INSURE VIP REWARDS AS LAWFULLY REQUIRED PRIOR TO SALE OF THE VIP REWARDS,AGAINGT HIGGINBOTHAMS LLC.,WHICH DID RESULT IN THE 8-8-16 SALE OF A 2003 LINCOLN TOWN CAR -WHICH IF TRUE FOR VOID OF $148.00 VIP REWARDS AND CONTRACT INPUT INTTENTIONALLY DESIGNED TO INFLICT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AT ANY ENFORCEMENT AND PLANNED BLOCKADE TO SERVICE AT MERCEDES-BENZ CHECK BY AGENT OF NORTH AMERICA PORSCHE,AT HIGGINBOTHAMS LLC., MERCEDES AND PORSCHE PASS OF OF CAR QUALITY AS THAT THAT HAD BEEN INSPECTED,INSURED,SERVCED AND WELL KEPT THEREAT WHEN IN FACT NO SERVICE HAD EVER BEEN DONE,INSPECTED,OR PERFOMED AT ALL or is available.
AVAILABLE THERE AT ENFORCEMENT
UPON A POTENTIALLY DEADLY VECHILE KNOWINGLY POTENTIAL SAFE DRIVING INTENT OF PURCHASER BUT FOR RECENT LIFE THREATNING VECHILE ACCIDENT OR POTENTIAL LITIGATION
DEPRIVIATION OF USCA 14 EQUAL PROTECTION OF 2016 PGIC POLICY APPLICATIONS AT POLICY NO.91170722 CULMATIVE EXISTANCE AND NONREWAL STAGE.
VIOLATION OF USCA ONE TAKING OFFICIALINSURANCE EMPLOYMENT POWERS TO INFLICT PROHIBITED ACTS OF "FUNDAMENTAL VITAL SAFETY AND TRANSPORTION INTERESTS' TO CHILL PETITION OF GOVERNMENT AND HINDER ONGOING SAFETY OF INSURED DUE OF ANY "PRO SE,INDIGENT,PROSECUTOR OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN A POTENTIAL $36 MILLION DOLLAR CASE " OF CLAIMS INSURED DURING SUCH LITIGATION, IN THAT:
Chapter 65 - REGULATION OF VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACTS
§ 83-65-109 - Issuance, sale, or offer for sale of reimbursement insurance policy


Universal Citation: MS Code § 83-65-109 (2013)
A reimbursement insurance policy shall not be issued, sold, or offered for sale in this state unless the reimbursement insurance policy conspicuously states that the issuer of the policy shall provide on behalf of the provider all services which the provider is legally obligated to provide according to the provider's contractual obligations under the vehicle service contracts issued or sold by the provider.
VIOLATION
Due AND
AND\OR APPLICATION OF OFFICIAL TELEPHONE CLAIMS ,BUT FOR OFFICIAL POLICY MANUAL AMBIGIOUS DESIGN AS APPLIED TO IMPROPERLY USURP BALANCE POWER OF INSURANCE COMPANY AGAINST CONSUMERS FAIR OR BEST CASE SCENARIO AS READ AND UNDERSTOOD OFFICIAL PGIC POLICY 2016 (LACK OF INFO TO MAKE CLAIM * HERE MISS COI TAKE OVER) CONTRAST TO PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE COMPANY,BROKERAGES,ADJUSTERS, AND\OR AGENTS IN VIOLATION OF:
The Due Process Clause as shown in the instant matter where more than once questions :
What process do I telephone and insure policy underwriting is accurate and not USCA AMEND 1 ACT TO CHILL PETITION OF GOVERNMENT?
What process do I obtain relief for an in operable hood?
What process do I obtain or Have in rental reimbursement and repair cost?
What process do I obtain or have against unruly bias agent decisions?
What process is due in "authorization to disassemble matters" and at the three claims Silver Creek,Collins and Bassifield did I RECIEVE that process?
P.O. Box
Jackson,Mississippi 39201

In re: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
DATE: FEBUARY 5, 2017

Mr.Chaney:
Sir, Progressive Gulf Insurance Company by and through acts or omissions of acts of Agent and Adjuster has caused undue distress and such acts or omissions thereof were intentional and with reckless disregard for duty,truth, and policy requirements.
On August 8, 2016 I purchased a 2003 Lincoln Town Car from Mercedes and Porsche in Jackson. Agent of Quality Insurance during the initial underwriting of policy did not:
1. Include roadside services,
2. Did not have deductible at $1000.00 but instead $2000.00.
3. Did not RECIEVE a filled in Agreement to provide insurance from agent Kelly Joe Deadman and otherwise sign, complete and document specifically to include A VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT CALLED VIP REWARDS( THE REASON THE VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED IS BECAUSE IT INCLUDES A LOANER CAR PROVISION -RENTAL CARS DURING SERVICE OR REPAIRS -REIMBURSEMENTS OR FEES BY PROGRESSIVE WOULD BE UNNECESSARY -AS SUCH LOANER CAR INCLUDES FREE GAS, CAR WASH, AND NITORGEN.)
4. That my first claim, no.__________________was a roadside assistance request DURING WRITTING ON THE SONG "SPICKS" where sudden outpour of rain and a dead battery left sunroof open and if I recall correctly windows as well where down.
5. That at the call in for the claim is when I found that my deductible was $2000.00 instead of $1000.00 as set and no roadside service was in the policy.
6. That at the request of Progressive call in center a tow truck with jumpstart was dispatched and at jump-off decision was made not to tow in the car to a QUALIFIED REPAIR SHOP.
7. That later at a call to the agent in Brandon I informed her that my hood was inoperable and was uncordially spoken with intentional with provocational intent weilding out that :
"Progressive don't fix that in effect ""DENING THE INOPERABLE HOOD LATCH CLAIM WHILE INSURED WAS IN JACKSON- WITHIN THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY EIGHT MILE TOW LIMIT - NEAR 'QUALIFIED' SERVICE SHOPS" IN CONTRAST TO EXPLAINING THE CLAIM SUBMITTANCE PROCEDURE.
8. That at the time I had comprehensive,collision, and roadside assistance frustrated by the way the Agent spoke with me and other litigation all safety interests I MERELY LEFT JACKSON BEING SERVERLY EMOTIONALLY UNBALANCED AND SHOCKED IN LIGHT OF COVERAGE.
9. That some days or time later I again needed PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE COMPANY TO ACT ON POLICY NO. 91170722 PROVISIONS----THE BATTERY AGAIN WAS DEAD, HOWEVER THE HOOD LATCH YET INOPERABLE WOULD NOT ALLOW A JUMPSTART FOR THE HOOD WOULD NOT OPERATE TO OPEN.
10. In accord widespread accepted,systematic or otherwise 8-mile tow limit AND THE FAILURE OF AGENT TO MERELY GIVE ME THE NUMBER TO PROGRESSIVE TO FILE MY CLAIM PROPERLY(SEE PARA 7) at the request of progressive the vehicle was towed to an unqualified service shop for repairs,in that:
A. The serviceman himself told the insured a list of things he do and didnt do stating his equipment was limited and services few.
B. Serviceman said he has no dealing with insurance company and I had to pay AND
C. Serviceman was merely the closest within 8-miles and at the request of Progressive where my vehicle was towed as such serviceman :
1. Found that a oil change,coils,battery and hood latch needed repairs.
2. Serviceman did not find ANY TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS,REAR SWAY BAR, OR REAR AXLE PROBLEMS.
11. That Progressive as in two later claims DID NOT SEND AN ADJUSTER TO SILVER CREEK SERVICEMAN SHOP, OR REQUEST ANY AUTHORIZATION TO DISASSEMBLE.
12. The process used to contact PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE WAS BY MAIL WITH RECIEPTED FOR A RENTAL CAR FEES AND REPAIR FEES, OR\AND BY PHONE, HOWEVER NO REIMBURSEMENT OF RENTAL FEES OR REPAIR COSTS EVER CAME.
13. For this component of INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF DISTRESS AT PARA 1-12 I SEEK ONLY:
Comprehensive,Collision,and Roadside Services by PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE COMPANY ON MY NEXT VECHILE DUE AT THE STANDARD OF A LOANER CAR FOR 36 MONTHS AT NO COST-----whereby a VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT AT INITIAL SALE WAS VOID FROM START OR UNFAIR AND DECIETFUL BUSINESS TRADE ACT WHICH IM CONFIDENT THE AGO OFFICE WILL MAKE THAT CONTRACT ENFORCEABLE UPON NOTICE MAILED FEBUARY 3, 2017.
14. That these remaining facts are made to show how failure to send an adjuster to the SILVER CREEK REPAIR SHOP WAS AN EVASION OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
A. In a Collins,Mississippi matter ADJUSTER JOHN PACE\CASEY claimed he "ruled"on a claim against the insured stating WEAR AND TEAR ON $5000.00 REPAIRS NEEDED --THAT WAS NOT FOUND IN OR DURING THE SILVER CREEK REPAIRS BY THE REPAIRMAN--HOWEVER IN THAT MATTER NO "AUTHORIZATION TO DISASSEMBLE" WAS EVER DELIVERED AND SIGNED BY THE INSURED" AS SUCH WOULD PREVENT ADJSTER JOHN CASEY\PACE ABILITY TO RECIEVE A DISASSEMBY REPORT. IN OTHER WORDS THE ADJUSTER DID NOT REVIEW THE SILVER CREEK MATTER AT ALL AND
B. Promised to provide a "authorization to disassemble" but I got the wear and tear ruling prior to getting an authorization to disassemble shockingly.
C. In a Bassifield, Mississippi matter an inoperable fan suddenly IRRATIONALLY AT PROGRESSIVE REQUEST an Enterprise VECHILE was sent to pick up the insured and riders AT COSTS TO PROGRESSIVE, HOWEVER ADJUSTER JOHN PACE\CASEY PROMISED AN " AUTHORIZATION TO DISASSEMBLE" HOWEVER ADJUSTER JOHN PACE\CASEY CANCELED THE ENTERPRISE RENTAL TRUCK REQUIRED IT RETURN TO HATTIESBURG AT MY PERSONAL COSTS, SHOCKINGLY UPON:
1. Strict contrast to Progressive Gulf Insurance Company that once a rental VECHILE is issued by PROGRESSIVE for up to 30 days and until insured VECHILE is operable such Rental is not to be cancelled,however Adjuster sent an AUTHORIZATION TO DISASSEMBLE MIS-STIPULATING INSURED ARGUMENT WITH "COSTS" OF REPAIRS INSTEAD OF "PROXIMATELY CAUSE AND TIME OF DAMAGES" which I refused to sign.
Conclusion, as a result of the cancellation of the rental agreement in the Bassifield matter,whereby I reviewed the FIRST AUTHORIZATION TO DISASSEMBLE FROM THE ADJUSTER:
1. After returning Enterprise Truck rental upon departure from enterprise in fact AFTER the claim had been denied!
2. The mechanic who took my car into his storage called later saying he cranked the car and the fan was running again miraculously so I picked up my VECHILE and gave the mechanic my policy number and tried to call Progressive to seek his storage fees.
15. On or about November 1, 2016 the insured RECIEVE a nonrewal notice from PROGRESSIVE so I demanded the remaining months cancelled SEVERELY AGGRIEVED FROM THE HANDLING OF QUALITY INSURANCE AG AND OR PROGRESSIVE GULF INSURANCE COMPANY.
16. On or about January 30, 2017 the VECHILE same cooling fan system exploded water every in PRENTISS, Mississippi projects whereby I have contacted the CONSUMER PROTECTION AGENCY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE FOR VECHILE SERVICE CONTRACT INVESTIGATION AND DEMAND:
Maximum allowed damages for emotional distress and actual repair and rental costs Estimated at $25,000.00 as set out in the policy.

DA COACH KIM-CROSBY PROJECTS
PMINK ,PO BOX 188 PRENTISS, MISSISSIPPI 39474-0188
(601)792-8567
FEBUARY 10, 2017
prisonmusicink@gmail.com







So filed this the_______day of _________2017 A.D.

Respectfully Submitted;



Pro Se, Eric D. JONES
PO Box 188
Prentiss,Mississippi 39474
1(601)808-1430












CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Lobbying.







UNLAWFUL OFFICERS IN DEGUISE AS PERSONS ACTING UNDER COLOR OF LAW WITHOUT ERIC DEJUAN JONES AUTHORIZATION AND/OR UNKNOWN CHARTER INTENTIONS OR PURPOSES,WHO,VICTIM HEREIN REJECTS SUCH BLOG SHOULD HAVE EVER PUBLISHED SUBTAINALLY HAS HARMED NATION DEFENSE AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY OF VICTIM INYERESTS AND BUSINESS PROPRIETARY INTERESTS AND THE EFFICIENT OPERATON OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECORD-KEEPING, PUNITIVE AND FORCED ADMINSTRATION OF MEDICATION OR FINALITY OF DISCHARGE FUNCTIONS.
B.ALPHABET,JNC. HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE THE EXEMPTIONS OF THE FOIA AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ,AS DISCRETIONARY RATHER THAN MANDATORY --HOWEVER THE CRIMES OF TORTURE AND PEONAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN INFLICTED FROM SAID BLOG AND IT CONTINUED PUBLIC DICLOSURE
C. An Executive Order should classify this blog pursuant to 5 U.S.C.S. 552(b)(1).
ANY AND ALL, ANY AND ALL DIRECT OR INDIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A 2007 BLOG*_@ERIC JONES AKA ERIC CROSBY ON GOOGLE, OWNED BY ALPHABET INC., AT PRESENT IN CONTROL OF SERVICE AND DOMAIN, OR REMOVAL THEREFROM was not by result of victim,who until 2013 and 2017 merely reviewed blog and it'sTORTURE AND PEONAGE effects,constitutes a cybercrime,FRAUD AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS ON :

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A.June 2007 and B. June 2012 several unknown and otherwise known persons knowingly access GOOGLE INTERNET WITHOUT EVIDENCE OVERRUDING PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF VICTIM AND EXCEEDING PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AUTHORIZED ACCESS, AND BY MEANS OF SUCH CONDUCT HAVE CONSPIRED IN OBTAINING INFORMATION THAT SHOULD BY CLASSIFIED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER OR REQUIRE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PROTECT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DAILY DISCLOSURES FOR REASONS OF NATIONALITY DEFENSES OR FOREIGN RELATIONS AS TO RESTRICT DATA DOUND AT BLOG AT ISSUE UN 2007, HAVING EXPERIENCED TORTURE AND PEONAGE SUCH BLOG AND LATER EMAIL SECRET 36 MONTHS SLAVERY AND TORTURE SCHEME COULD BE USED TO INJURIOUSLY UPON THE UNITED STATES OR TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ANY FOREIGN NATIONALIST TO WILLFULLY COMMUNICATE,DELIVER,TRANSMIT OR CAUSE TO BE COMMUNICATED, DELIVERED OR TRANSMITTED OR CAUSE TO BE COMMUNICATED , DELIVERED,OR TRANSMITTED THE SAME TO "MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS EMPLOYEES AND EVEN INMATES, WHO WERE NOT ENTITLE TO RECIEVE IT OR WILLFULLY RETAIN THE SAME AND THOSE PARTIES THEREIN FAILED TO DEKIVER IT TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES ENTITLED TO RECIEVE SAID BLOG AND SECRET EMAIL,WHICH INTENTION ACCESS WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION IN EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED INMATE ACCESS TO COMPUTERS, THEREBY ALLOWING PRISONERS DURING JUNE 2007 TO PRESENT, TO OBTAIN SAID BLOG AND SECRET EMAIL, OBVIOUSLY DERIVED OF DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES IF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS ,OR OTHER PROTECTED COMPUTERS, INTENDED TO DEFRAUD VICTIM OF ACQUITAL AND ANY FUTURE FAIR TRIALS, AND INTENTIONALLY TO CAUSE STREET JUSTICE,INSTANT OR SUDDEN DEATH, OR ASSASINATION ATTEMPTS OF VICTIM.
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WHICH KNOWN OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , ELECTRONIC NOTICE OR INDEPENDENT ACTION THEREIN,BY LETTER AND/ OR OTHER FCTA OFFICIAL FORMS(HEREBY INVOKING FOIA DISCLOSURE OF ANY AND ALL CONTACTING CALLS,LETTERS,FORMS,EMAILS,COMPLAINTS(WHETHER HOUSING OR OTHERWISE), TO HAVE BEEN Proximate cause of violations of the FOIA EXCEPTIONS 5 U.S.C. Section(b)(1)-(9)

A. Since June 7,2012 ,through those persons set forth at paragraph two shockingly imposed on the final day of discharge morning without notice or hearing the revoke EARNED RELEASE SUPERVISION THAT HAD BEEN GRANTED MAY 22, 2012, IRRATIONALLY all employees of line of sight protocol beginning about 3:00p.m. June 7, 2012 stating "PLANS HAD CHANGE!" THEREBY, ABSURDINGLY I WAS GIVEN A PHONE CALL HOME, A TIME SHEET OF MS DEPT. CORRECTIONS SHOWING (36)THRITY-SIX MONTHS HAD BEEN EXTENDED, VIOLATIVE OF MS ST SECTION 47-5-99-TO-104 PROHIBITION UPON COMMISSIONER EPPS AUTORITY AND POWER , BY AN EMAIL DIRECTIVE TO EXCESSIVELY AND PROLONG THE CONFINEMENT OF INMATE 50222, ERIC DEJUAN JONES ONLY BY SAID OPENLY AND INHERENTLY U.S.C.A. ONE{RELIGIOUS,SPEECH,ASSEMBLY,INFORMATION,AND GOVERNMENTAL PETITIONING};U.S.C.A. FOUR {ILLEGAL SEIZURE BY AND THROUGH SECRET EMAIL STATE OR FEDERAL OR MILITARY DIRECTIVE} ;U.S.C.A. FIVE SELF-INCRIMINATION ABUSE OF POWERS AND FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ESTABLISHED OF SANDIN V. O'CONNER CASES LAWS, U.S.C.A. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICAL MOB/PRISON ROIT LIKE EVASION OF JURY TRIAL WITH A "MOCK" PUBLIC TORTURE TRIAL,;U.S.C.A. EIGHT "TORTURE SCANDAL", AND U.S.C.A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED DUE PROCESS MDOC SOP 18-01-01 DISCIPLINARY STATEWIDE PROCEEDURES AND EQUAL PROTECTION,ACCESS AND SERVICES OF HEALTH CARE VETERANS RE-RENTRY PROGRAM, SOCIAL SERVICES,OR INFORMED CONSENTUAL NON-PUNITIVE FORCED ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUG ADMINISTRATION, SPECIFICALLY JULY 12, 2012 AND APRIL 23, 2013 CULMATIVE VIOLATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS;
B.Which were specifically intended to inflict severe physical food and rest depriviation and civil liberties freedom from incarcerations plows and/or mental pain or suffering including instant death to moment to moment "FIGHT OR FLIGHT" SUFFERING INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL HOUSING, DOUBLE-CELLING , NON-DISCRETIONARY BLANKET WIDESPREAD PROHIBITION OF PROTECTIVE CUSTODY OF ALL PRISONERS THEREAT EAST MISSISSIPPI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY WHERE ALL PRISONERS ARE WIDESPREAD SYSTEMATICALLY DEEMED A THREAT TO THEMSELVES OR OTHERS,OR THEIR PROPERTY OR OTHERS AND CANNOT BE HOUSED IN NORMAL PRISONS OR GENERAL POPULATION;
C.WhichI was inflicted therewith,by NUMBEROUS PERSONS ALLOWED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY RADIO, TELEVISION, SCANNERS, WIRE AND ORAL INTERCEPTION OR WIRETAPPINGS OF 'ONE WAY NON PROVABLE OR SUSTAINABLE , MANIACAL SLEEP DEPRIVIATIONS SECRET DEVICES, OR ANY AND ALL EMPLOYEES,INMATES,OR ENCOUNTERS WITHIN INMATE 50222, DUTIFUL BOUND OF PROTOCOL LINE OF SIGHT OFFICERS AT "EMCF" TOP RANKING OFFICIALS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OWNERS AND/OR OTHERS WHICH ALSO MAY HAVE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INITIATED OR CONTINUED PHYSICAL CONTROL OR CUSTODY AT EMCF PREDICATED UPON SAID "BLOG AT ISSUE" SEVERE MENTAL PAIN AND SUFFRRING OF DETERIORATION OF THE BRAIN,MEANING THE PROLONGED MENTAL BRAIN DISEASE OF "SCHIZOPHERNIA,COMMAND HALLUCINATIONS, BIPOLAR, OR OTHERWISE CAUSED BY AND RESULTING FROM "TORTURE OF BEING KIDNAPPED RESPECTIVELY BY A SOVERGNITY GOVERNMENT",
D. That this intentional infliction was not a mere threat of infliction, but actual physical pain during the the Brian DETERIORATION process and suffering life long expected to continue til death of myself,
E. That ADMINSTRATION and Application ,not mere threatening thereof did initiate and finalize this secret email TORTURE scheme though antipsychotic medication,against the informed consent and verbal refusal (non aggressional resistance but for felony asaualt charges risk) application, of mind -altering substances were forced into bodily cells,tissues,organs or other regions therein (believed to have a seven year disrupting malfunctioning in not continued),
F. Other PROCEEDURES of DIRECT RADIO-ONE WAY FCC REGULATED HARMFUL INTERFERENCES CALCULATED TO DISRUPT PROFOUNDING THE EYE,EARS, NOSE, TOUNGE AND LIMBS,TO-WIT: FINGERS,HANDS,ARMS,JOINTS,FEET,AND BODILY MOVEMENT SENSORY VOLITION AND COGNITION,
G. Other PROCEEDURES to disrupt profoundly RELIGIOUS programming , Non-verbal Social skills,and communication and unsoundness of civil languages other than ancient prison terminology which deprives continuation normal 2017 interaction outside such class behavior or activities,
H. That such personal safety dependant upon self preservation from being inflicted dismemberment or wounds likely to produce imminent or sudden death ,upon negligence or lack of care of otherwise applicable DUTIFULLY required as actors under color of law,
I.That on or about 21 days after threat of prolonged confinement plan changing by AMY HODGESON, WHO MAY HAVE BEEN ADMINSTRATION FEDERAL FUNDS DURING SUCH JUNE 2,2012 TIME SPAN,SUBJECTED I,MYSELF INMATE 50222, WOULD BE IMMINENTLY SUBJECT TO DEATH BY ADJACENT INMATE IN CELL #518, OR SEVERE PHYSICAL ATTACK, SUFFERING OPEN MASTURBAUTION DEFILEMENT,WITH FECES,AND URINE DAILY OF SAID INMATE, AT FOOD TRAY SLOT #517,PURPOSED ONLY UPON TIME EXTENSION OF (36)THRITY-SIX MONTHS, WHICH PREVADED JULY 11,2012 FORCED ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDING AND FINAL RESULT,UPON INMATE AT #518 HOLLERING,MASTERBUATION,AND LYING INTENTIONAL INTERUPTION AND MOCKERY, WHO UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF HAD KNOWLEDGE OF "SECRET EMAIL," which did upon force intrusion and assistance of Correctional Officers mind-altering antipsychotic drugs was punitively used upon,myself by staff,
I. Without other PROCEEDURES of a lay advisor or disclosure of any documents, my sensense was disrupted profoundly in that at time extension MY CUSTODY WAS UPGRADED,AND A SENSE OF WAR PRISONER ILLUSUONAL MILITARY TAKE OVER DID OCCUR AS TO AFFECT MY PERSONALITY THAT OF A " SLAVE."
3. That the United States Executive Offices of President,Department of Health and Human Affairs,Department Homeland Security,Department of Justice, Department of Defense, The Army DISCHARGE Review Board,The US Army Board of Corrections,Department of Veterans Affairs,Department of State,Department of Commerence, Department of Small Business Administration, and Department of Treasury,United States Secretary of Army,Department of Education,whether by and through knowledge or information derivable ,clearly establishing claims and evidence ,that lack of care or negligence therein at :
A. Department of Veterans Affairs failure to appear at FEBUARY 1995 bond hearing on the morning of the Oklahoma City Bombing,
B.Department of Veterans Affairs failure to appear at OCTOBER 1995 pre-sentence investigation reporting,sentencing, or any post hearing felony conviction stages,
C.Department of Veterans Affairs failure to appear at Drill Unit prior to November 1997 and certify Discharge as the like of the 1992 enlistment stages,
D. Department of Veterans Affairs or Department of Treasury failure to ascertain ineligibility of funds,programs,and services---BUT FOR LACK OF TIME SERVED-------CURRENTLY DISPUTING MY LACK OF ENOUGH TIME SERVED OR WITHDRAWAL of time served OCTOBER 1995 to preclude COMPENSATION,PENSION,AND OTHER PROGRAMS OR SERVICES,
E. The Army Review Discharge Board failure to downgrade discharge to "SERVICE-CONNECTED Disabilities,mental ."
F. The process of consult intake was UNLAWFULLY BY AND THROUGH VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S. CODE CHAPTER 77 PEONAGE, SLAVERY,AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, PER 42 U.S. CODE 1994 SUCH PEONAGE ABOLISHED;
AND 18 U.S. CODE SECTION 1581 VIOLATIVE DID MS AGO TOMMY D. GOODWIN HOLD OR RETURN PERSONS : ERIC DEJUAN JONES AND SAMUEL MARTIN TO A FALSE MDOC CUSTODY AND CONTROL, AKIN TO SAMUEL MARTIN KIDNAPPING ERIC DEJUAN JONES OR ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP PERSONS OF ERIC JONES UNDER INTRUSIVE DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS OR OTHER DEPARTMENTS ABOVE OF THE UNITED STATES INTRUSIVELY AND OVERBROAD LY CAUSING AGGRAVATING SEXUAL ABUSE OR ATTEMPT TO PRACTICE LEWD UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND TO COMMIT AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ABUSE FROM LACK OF NORMAL SEXUAL CONTACT OVER AND AFTER A PERIOD OF TORTURE, WHETHER OR NOT WITH INTENT OR ACTUAL ATTEMPTS TO KILL THE PERSON OF ERIC DEJUAN JONES,OR CREDIBLE THREATS,
The law command that such MS AGO BE FINED, IMPRISONED OR BOTH HAVING THUS UTILIZING CONDITION OF PEONAGE, AND CONTINUATION OF JUNE 7,2012 SECRET EMAIL ARREST UNTIL FEBRUARY 13, 2015.
18 U.S. CODE 1581 NOTICE TO ALL INTERCEPTERS, READERS OF OTHERWISE BE YE HEREBY NOTIFIED
WHOEVER OBSTRUCTS,OR ATTEMPTS TO OBSTRUCT, OR IN ANY WAY INYERFERES WITH OR PREVENTS THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS SECTION,SHALL BE LIABLE TO THE PENALTIES PRESCIBED IN SUBSECTION (A)ANY TERM OF YEARS OR LIFE,OR BOTH, AND FINED.

G.That Upon information and belief UNITED STATES ATTORNEY HAROLD BRITIAN, ATTORNEY FOR USDOJ STEVEN J. GRIFFIN, ATTORNEY TOMMY D. GOODWIN AND/OR ATTORNEY ROBERT H. PEDERSON ENTICED VIOLATIVE OF 18 U.S. CODE 1583 SAMUEL MARTIN OR FEDERAL MAGISTRATE TO ALLOW KIDNAPPING OR CARRYING AWAY OF ERIC DEJUAN JONES FROM FEDERAL COURT,WITH INTENT THAT SUCH OTHER PERSON SAMUEL MARTIN SELL OR PURCHASED INTO INVOLUNTARY SER ITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES, HELD BY SAMUEL MARTIN,BROTHER AS A SLAVE, SAMUEL MARTIN BEING ENTICED OR INDUCED TO PERSUADE ERIC DEJUAN JONES TO 1433 ROSS CIRCLE, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI AS INTENT TO MAKE AND BE HELD AS A SLAVE UNTIL ON OR ABOUT JUNE 2014,
H. Obstruction,attempts to obstruct and in NUMBEROUS Intrusive unreasonable digital, electronically,and physical arrests,seizuires or searches of ERIC DEJUAN JONES PERSON,PAPERS,PROPERTY, AND EFFECTS HAVE BY AND THROUGH :
A. Threats of SAMUEL MARTIN, OR DECIETFUL THEREIN,
B. Hinds County Circuit Court Habeas Corpus delay, denial or for sale writ "push-back by recusal and non-assingnment,"
C.SECRET ENTICEMENTS PRESSURE,PERSUASION AND UNLAWFUL BAIS ELECTRONIC INDUCEMENTS OF SHIRLEY MAE JONES HENCE JUNE 2014 TO PRESENT WHOM HAS ALSO MADE SLAVE OF ERIC DEJUAN JONES AND/OR UNCONSCIOUSLY OBSTRUCTS,ATTEMPTS TO OBSTRUCT, OR IN CHURCH OPEN PRAYER,HOME PRAYING, NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER CONSPIRATOL ACTS AND ACTIONS HAVE INTERFERED WITH ENFORCEMENT OF 18USCS CODE 1583(3).
D. That from JUNE 2, 2012 HUNDREDS OF ACTIONS OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WITH RESOECT TO DOCUMENTS IN FURTHERANCE IF TRAFFICKING,PEONAGE,SLAVERY, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,OR FORCED LABOR TO (1)THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OR (2)THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FEDERAL OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, SAAG TOMMY D. GOODWIN IN VIOLATION SECTION 1592,THE IS MORE APPROPIATELY HANDLED BY THIS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Thus commiting acts of forced USA labor,involuntary servitude or secret servitude,slavery control and custody On April 14, 2014 in CAMERA OF HEARING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE ,JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI BEGAN THE TRAFFICKING OF MY,PERSONS BY AND THROUGH MULTIPLE UNKNOWN AND KNOWN BENEFICIARIES WHO FINANCIALLY IN STATE OF ALABAMA ,REGIONS BANK, FROM "TRAFFICKING OF ERIC DEJUAN JONES THROUGH #50222 USA CYBER CUSTODY AND CONTROL, NEGLIEGENCE OR LACK OF CARE DUE UPON DISCOVERY OF JUNE 2, 2012 36 MONTHS EMAIL SCHEME TO HINDER,IMPEDE, AND THRUST PERSONS OF HUMAN ASCERTAINABLE QUALITIES FROM DIAGNOIS AND TREATMENT AND BENEFITS ELIGIBILITY AND CONSULT DEMANDS AT DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS IN CONTRAST TO STATE PRISON INPATIENT SETTING OF EMCF.
G. That this 2006-2017 MOCK VETERAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED IN VIOLATION OF :
A. Crime of TORTURE 18 USCS 2340 JUNE 7, 2012 TO DECEMBER 18, 2013 OR THEREABOUT MY ACTUAL DISCHARGE FROM EAST MS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY ,WHERE THIS CURRENT UNIITED STATES FREEDOM OF INFORMATON OFFICER CAN LOCATE DOCUMENTS IN LAUDERDALE CIRCUIT COURT HOUSE AND THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTHOUSE UN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI OF CLAIMED: SLAVERY,
B. CRIMES of Trafficking,slavery,involuntary servitude,and PEONAGE did occur JUNE 7, 2012 UNTIL FEBUARY 13,2015 BY DEGUISE UPON MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRCTIONS JURISDICTION CONTROL AND CUSTODY.

WHEREFORE, THE VICTIM IN THIS REPORT IS :ERIC DEJUAN JONES, PO BOX 188, PRENTISS, MISSISSIPPI 39474 AND THE DEFENDANT IS THE UNITED STATES NOTWITHSTANDING OTHER CLAIMS OR DISPUTES OF PARTIES HEREIN OR AFTER 18 USCS SECTION 1593 MANDATORY RESTITUTION :
(a) Nothwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any ORTHER civil or criminal penalties authorized by law, THIS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR COURT SHALL ORDER RESTITUTION FOR ANY OFFENSE UNDER THIS CHAPTER,(b)(1) the order of restitution under this section shall direct THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS TO PAY VICTIM (THROUGH APPROPRIATE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR COURT MECHANISM)THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE VICTIM LOSSES, AS DETERMINED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OR COURT UNDER PARAGRAPH(3)OF THIS SUBSECTION(2) AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE ISSUED AND ENFORCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 364 IN THE SAME MANNER AS consent decree order or an order undersection3663A(3)As used in this subsection, the term? Full amount of the victim, Eric DeJuan Jones losses has the same meaning as provided in section 2259(b)(3) and shall in addition include the greater of gross income or value of ERIC DEJUAN JONES PRIOR SERVICEMANSHIP, TORTURE ENDURED, LEGAL STUDIES, AND PATIENCE OR ENDURANCE OF PEONAGE, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, SLAVERY, OR VALUE OF DISRUPTING A SEVEN YEAR ONE BILLION DOLLARS CORRECTIONAL CONTRACTAL SCANDAL, DURING AN ASSASINATION ATTEMPT OR SALE INTO SLAVERY SECRET EMAIL SCHEME, as guaranteed under the Federal minimum wage and overtime gaurantees of $10.10 per hour continual 24-hours overtime STARTING JUNE 7,2012 AT NINE A.M. COMPOUNDING OVERTIME AFTER 8-HOURS AT $15.15 UNTIL ACTUAL TIME OF DISCHARGE ON FEBUARY 13, 2015 the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT(29 U.S.C. 201 ET. SEQ.,(.(4) for a total of $199,030.60 FOR JUNE 7, 2012 TO DECEMBER 18, 2013 AND$198,848. 80 during December 2013 to FEBRUARY 13, 2015 FOR A MINIMUM TOTAL DYE TYE VICTIM OF $39,879.40
(b)Any FORFEITURE of properties under this section including but not limited to, land and houses,prisons, electronic devices, currency, or otherwise used in the above crimes,torts,unlawful acts or involvement thereof shall be governed by the provisions of section 413(other than subsection(d) of such section) of the Controlled Substances ACT(21 U.S.C. 853).
Respectfully Submitted by email to the United States Department of Justice for CONSENT DECREE,IF AVAILABLE THIS THE MARCH 14, 2017 BY:ERIC DEJUAN JONES,PO BOX 188, PRENTISS, MISSISSIPPI 39474-0188 (601)808-1430






CONCLUSION
The goal of the FAIR HOUSING ACT is a "unitary "housing market is which a person's background (as opposed to financial resources) does not arbitrarily restrict access. And while the EXHIBIT TWO STATE OF MISSISSIPPI E-MAIL EFFECTS ONE ON JUNE 7, 2012 did arbitrarily inconsistent of that bedrock FUNDAMENTAL prosecutorial DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, NEGLIGENT OR LACK OF CARE AT "arrest of a ' dwelling'" process of A "JUSTICE COURT NOT CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE ,BAIL SETTING,ECT. social justice blog punishment "36 months for retributions of presumed actions or character therein,noriety but for Two prior ACQUITAL'S for murder of Tanya Ward and POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE;
The United States Constitution Double Jeopardy CLAUSES prohibited "blog punishment of 3 years" putting life,limb,liberty, and property interests of FREEDOM IN DWELLING INTENT IN 2012 AND AT CURRENT, INPATIENT-SETTING OF WARD,FREEDOM OF SUDDEN -DEATH THREATS AND USCA 2 RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS OR INVOKE "IRCA"OR RIGHT TO SEEK DEPORTATION FROM MISSISSIPPI.
In concluding the resolutions on The Fair Housing Act primary prohibition making it unlawful to REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE WITH CLAIMANT BECAUSE OF THAT PERSON'S INCLUSION IN A PROTECTED CLASS OF "AQUITTED BY JURY UNAMIOUS VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY" USCA FIVE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND USCA 14 DUE PROCESS AT ARREST FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRECLUDED BY " STATE OR FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL PROSECUTORIAL POWER, SEPARATE OF CONGRESS," AND CLASS OF RACE ANIMUS BASED 36 MONTHS INCREASING OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER.


Therefore in lieu of Filing Court action of federalism and taking of private limbs,torture and otherwise "PUNITIVE 3 years slavery without a jury trial" by secret email stating absurd words of possible criminal conduct as later found to be a corrupt COMMISIONER,SUBSTANATIVELY violating my RIGHT TO INFORM CONSENTUAL FAIR DWELLING FREE FROM CORRECTIONAL PHYSICAL CUSTODY.
That the current Deputy COMMISIONER Mr. JERRY WILLIAMS one day called my mom home and already during the endurance of the government, forced labor or otherwise which there are mandatory compensation federal statues that Either this SENATE OR HOUSE OR REPRESENTATIVES,
Upon the FAIR HOUSING ACT RESOLVE, THAT MY RESIDENT RV CAN BE REMEDIED AS THE FAIR HOUSING ACT WOULD ALLOW.
" ICRA" as a law criminalized the act of engaging in a " pattern or practice" of knowingly hiring an "unauthorized alien" an established financial and other penalties for those employing illegal immigrants under the theory that low prospects for employment would reduce undocumented immigration.
Regulations progmulated under the Act introduced the I-9 form to ensure each EAST MISSISSIPPI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EMPLOYEES PRESENTED DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF THEIR LEGAL ELIGIBILITY TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT DURING JUNE 7,2012 TO FEBUARY 13,2015, IN THE UNITED STATES.
That these sanctions if applied only to line of sight protocol employers that had more than three employees WHO VIOLATIVE OF THE "ICRA" ATTEMPED TO TAKE COMPLAINTANT OUT IN DIRECTIVE OF A BLOG AND EMAIL SCHEME, AND EAST MISSISSIPPI CORRECTIONAL FACILITY DID NOT MAKE A SUFFICIENT EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE LEGAL STATUS OF THOSE EMPLOYEES,WORKERS, OR CLAIMAINT 36 MONTHS REMOVAL,WITHDRAWAL,PROLONGMENT OR EXTENSION THEREOF WOULD CONSTITUTE NEGLIEGENCE OR LACK OF CARE,OF US ATTORNEYS INVOLVED.
The authenticity of the workers documents EXHIBIT ONE AND TWO are worker's documents as a intent for the claimant to "learn" or be involuntary servitude. There exist disputes whether each EMCF worker or ONLY STATE ITSELF, wherein there has been no focus on employees knowledge or opposition to the 36 months prolongment and extension, and \or "Arrest'of a DWELLING'"
And the question of Foreign Labor now arises. COMPLAINTANT as opposition to the prisoners and employees ,gather intelligence during imprisonment efforts for schematic purposes ACCOMPLISHED WITH IN LESS THAN 30 DAYS AFTER THE PRISON DISCHARGE REMOVAL, ON JULY 12, 2012 MY HUMAN BEINGS OF A PERSON WAS ASSAULTED WITH ANTI-PSYCHOTIC DRUGS.
"Until 2012, there was virtually no movement in Congress to deal with the problem of the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,which granted ammesty to many of the 3.2 million illegal immigrants living n the United States.."

WHEREFORE THE FAIR HOUSING ACT was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and codified at 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, with penalities for violation at 42 U.S.C. 3631. It is enforced by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Developement.
T





29 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/104444830077299057705 Jordan Hill : In today's post on the blog, I show a lot of pages that I've finished up this week, some of which I've...
In today's post on the blog, I show a lot of pages that I've finished up this week, some of which I've been working on sporadically for as long as five or six weeks. I had a lot of fun this week, and I think it shows!
Graphic Patterns and Experiments (Week of 3/19/2017)
I'm back today with another weekly roundup of the art journal pages I ended up finishing up. I've been working in this same journal for six or seven weeks, and almost all of its 80 pages have been worked on to some extent. I'...
30 days ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/100701127557531810466 Fedor Pisarkov :

Lions Add Defensive Tackle Jordan Hill to Trenches
Air Jordan Nu Retro 1 Lo Black / White - Varsity Red Basketball The Seattle Seahawks selected Hill 87th overall in the third round of th...
1 month ago - Via Google+ - View -
https://plus.google.com/100701127557531810466 Fedor Pisarkov : Lions Add Defensive Tackle Jordan Hill to Trenches The Seattle Seahawks selected Hill 87th overall in...
Lions Add Defensive Tackle Jordan Hill to Trenches
The Seattle Seahawks selected Hill 87th overall in the third round of the 2013 draft. In his rookie year, he notched 7 tackles with 1.5 sacks in only four games. However, his production peaked the following year. Hill recorded 19 tackles, 5.5 sacks, 4 passes defended, and one interception in 2014. The Penn State standout had a nice start in the Pacific Northwest, yet injuries ultimately derailed his development. Seattle released Hill in October of this past year after the second season-ending injury of his career.

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https://plus.google.com/110158260591345521638 Halo Bat : Onistly i need to give shoutouts, these people have been making me happy ever sence I've meet them they...
Onistly i need to give shoutouts, these people have been making me happy ever sence I've meet them they actually are really nice and good artist too. The names are down bellow. But ive been really sad lattly and not somtimes

+Omega Netflix
+Kiri SilverSoul
+O.C. MADNESS
+Melody Moonlight
+Jordan Hill
+Skye CanTasteRainbows
And mabey some others too.
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